THEOLOGY

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Edited by the Rev. E. G. Selwyn, M.A., Redhill Rectory, Havant, to whom all editorial matters should be addressed.

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EDITORIAL

The Summer Session of the National Assembly was memorable for two things especially, both of them speaking of promise rather than of performance. The first was the way in which, above and behind the long financial debate which occupied the first two days, we seemed to catch glimpses, fleeting but recurrent, of a new age of educational enterprise in the history of the Church. The Bishop of Oxford, in the truly great (and yet quite brief) speech in which he introduced the Training Colleges estimates, first lifted the veil on the future; and it never altogether fell again. It was not merely a question of the religious training of our teachers or of the continuance of Knutsford, but something far vaster—the premonition of a time when the constructive imagination which gave birth to our ancient colleges and schools would again be given scope and call. Of the ancient foundations, the schools at least have quite laid aside their original purpose of educating the poor. Are, then, their noblest features—the corporate life in the atmosphere of the Church's faith and worship, directed to the attainment of all liberal acts and knowledge—to be for ever denied to the sons and daughters of all but the well-to-do? That was the question which gradually formulated itself during the Assembly's discussion of the Budget for 1922; and its answer was not uncertain.

The second point of interest was the Parochial Church Councils (Further Powers) Measure, containing the two contentious clauses postponed from the earlier Bill. The issues were the rights of Councils in regard to the appointment of Incumbents and to the arrangement of services. Both of them closely affected the position of the clergy, and division between the two houses of clergy and laity seemed often not unlikely. But the difference of character between the two proposals was well brought out in the debate. The first was seen to be a matter of expediency, and the laity's strong desire to have a voice in the appointment of their parson was felt to outweigh possible defects in the particular method proposed for giving effect to it; if experience should prove these defects to be serious, the measure

can be amended, and indeed we suspect that they will be amended, when the question of patronage is more thoroughly taken in hand. But on the second question conscience and principle were soon seen to be vitally involved; one speech, in particular, from a priest, setting forth the Catholic doctrine of the ministry as the stewardship of the Word and Sacraments, made an ineffaceable impression. It was the kind of speech which forces a decision; and the members in charge of the measure gracefully accepted an amendment which preserved the unity of the House.

The two liturgical articles printed below will be welcomed, we believe, abroad, notably in South Africa, as well as at home. Dr. Atchley explains and illustrates the *nature* of Epiclesis and the diversity of forms in which it appears; and such a survey of the facts is essential to all progress in revision. Fr. Trenholme, on the other hand, deals with its *place* in the structure of the liturgy. We agree with him that the address to the Father in our present Consecration Prayer serves the purpose of Epiclesis sufficiently. In any case, if an explicit petition for the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the eucharistic gifts is to be restored, it should not be after the Words of Institution, but before them; and we are glad to hear that opinion in South Africa is moving in that direction. We may well regard the Latin tendency to tie down the moment of Consecration to the Words of Institution as due to a characteristic love of over-precision; but in these matters custom is of great importance, and Genuflexion, Elevation, and Adoration, which are inextricably associated with those Words, have come to stay; so that the insertion of a consecratory Epiclesis after them would surely be bewildering. Meanwhile we hope that it may not be long before the "Canterbury Canon" is again considered in this country.

The two discussions which we print this month of the document from Canada published in our last issue both concur in the view that the proposed forms of Commission agreed to by the Conference at Montreal are not satisfactory as they stand. The negotiations are of peculiar importance owing to their reaction upon similar problems in the Church of Scotland; and delay will be well worth while if it results in a procedure acceptable to their theologians as well as to ours. We understand that Scottish opinion would prefer some simple form of conditional ordination, if, as seems to be the case, local circumstances make "the precedents of 1610" inapplicable; but in any case it is vital that, with or without conditions, any form of ordination employed for the integration of ministries now separate should be unquestionably adequate and complete.

"SOME POSTULATES OF A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY"*

IV.—MEANING AND VALUE OF FINITE INDIVIDUALITY.

PLURALISM would make the finite Reals independent self-subsisting centres of activity—*i.e.*, souls would be absolutely independent of God. Monism would make the finite a part or element or aspect or appearance of the Whole, and in some sense ultimately identical with or part of the Absolute —*i.e.*, souls would be in some sense identical with or part of God and fulfil their true destiny in absorption into the Divine.

Christian theism has to steer a mid-way course and endeavour to preserve on the one hand a measure of independence and self-determination in relation to God on the part of the finite spirit, and on the other hand to give a rational account of the seemingly inevitable dualism set up by such an assumption and which all Absolutist systems seek to solve ultimately by pantheism.

A Christian philosophy must keep very close to the data of experience in its effort to solve the problem of the relation between the One and the Many.

Now what is the verdict of empirical data in the face of this problem? We can appeal to experience generally and to religious experience in particular.

No one has dealt more fully and clearly with this subject than Dr. Hastings Rashdall, and we cannot do better than indicate his points which are set out in an admirable Essay on "Personality: Human and Divine" in the volume of Oxford Essays entitled *Personal Idealism.*

He fixes upon one supreme fallacy in Hegelian thought which is fatal to any attempt to vindicate the ultimate reality and independence in any sense of the finite soul—a fallacy which may be detected in system after system of modern philosophical speculation.

It is the assumption that "what constitutes existence for others is the same as what constitutes existence for self." The fallacy—*i.e.*, of assuming that "a *thing* is as it is known: its

* Lectures delivered at Sion College, November, 1902.

esse is to be known: what it is for the experience of spirits, is its whole reality: it is that and nothing more."

Once grant this assumption and we cut the ground from under any claim of ultimate existence in itself for finite human personality. If our existence consists in our being known, if the reality of our finite individuality is to be found in the experience of the Absolute, then we are lost. There is no more powerful advocate for individualism in this connection than Dr. Rashdall who seeks to defend the following position:

"The *esse* of a person is to know himself, to be for himself, to feel and to think for himself, to act on his own knowledge, and to know that he acts. In dealing with persons, therefore, there is an unfathomable gulf between knowledge and reality. What a person is for himself is entirely unaffected by what he is for any other, so long as he does not know what he is for that other. No knowledge of that person by another, however intimate, can ever efface the distinction between the mind as it is for itself, and the mind as it is for another. The essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself. It is there that his *principium individuationis* is to be found—in what he is, when looked at from the inside."

"All the fallacies of our anti-individualist thinkers," says Dr. Rashdall, "come from talking as though the essence of a person lay in what can be known about him, and not in his own knowledge, his own experience of himself. And that, in turn, arises largely from the assumption that knowledge, without feeling or will, is the whole of Reality."

Now if this position can be maintained we have a most powerful bulwark against all pantheistic tendencies to absorb the finite self in a larger experience, to merge finite individuality in an All-inclusive consciousness.

"My toothache is for ever my toothache only, and can never become yours." If this is true, then each finite self as a centre of experience mirrors the universe in an unique and incommunicable way. My experience is mine. Others, by sympathy, may enter into it and to this extent claim to share it, but their knowledge of it and my knowledge are two distinct and distinguishable things, nor can they ever become identical.

Now, if the reality of the self is not exhausted in its relations with other selves, even though the development of the self be wholly conditional by its relationships—*i.e.*, the Non-Ego, including other selves and God—it follows that no matter how we may go out of our self in intimate relations with Another, we can never be so wholly lost in the relationship as to abandon the reality of what we are in ourselves. We are created and derive our being from God. He may know us through and

through, and His knowledge of us may be a deeper and profounder knowledge of our true self than we ourselves possess, but it remains true, none the less, that our reality is not God's knowledge of it, but something other than Himself—viz., our own self-knowledge as a subject of experience.

It is quite conceivable that God may feel what I feel and experience my experience, but not in the sense that when I feel what I feel and God feels my feeling there is a resultant one feeling, a resultant one experience. There is not. There are two feelings, two experiences. *His* and *Mine*.

This whole line of thought, which is what Dr. Rashdall tries to establish, if I understand him aright, is crucial for the reality of finite individuality. I am I and He is He. I am therefore for ever separate from God with a measure of uniqueness bestowed indeed upon me by Him in the act of Creation, but once bestowed not even God Himself can override it.

The publication of Professor Pringle-Pattison's Gifford Lectures and the subsequent Symposium of the Aristotelian Society on the question, Do finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being? have served a valuable end in making clear the real issues at stake for theism in the persistent deprecation of finite individuality detected in the philosophy of Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet. The issue raised is vital for a Christian philosophy of Personality, Human and Divine. We cannot too highly appreciate the searching analysis of Professor Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*), which Professor Pringle-Pattison has given us in Lectures XIV.-XV. of his book (*The Idea of God*), and in his subsequent paper at the Aristotelian Society in the discussion which arose as the result of the clearly defined issue between Absolutism and Christian theism on this point.

The issue was indicated by Professor Pringle-Pattison in these terms:

"The question is whether finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being—whether, that is to say, they must be taken as substances in the Aristotelian sense of πρώτη οὐσία, that which cannot stand in a judgment as predicate or attribute of anything else, the individual thing or being, in short, of which we predicate the universals which constitute its nature."

There is no question, of course, that we have suffered in the past from what Professor Bosanquet calls "irrational Personalism," and he is right in his protest against that extreme individualism which tends to regard the personal self as "an exclusive entity, simply living out a nature of its own." (*Value*

and Destiny, pp. 32-3.) We do not teach an exaggerated individualism of "one lone man in an atheistic universe," and we must be on our guard against Dr. McTaggart's concept of the finite Real, the absolute independence, suggested by the concept of the self as "a substance existing in its own right." Dr. Bosanquet is right in reminding us that "we approach the study of finite self-conscious creatures, prepared to find in them the fragments of a vast continuum" (p. 11). We have to remember that as Professor Pringle-Pattison puts it, "historically the individual is organic to society," and so "in a still larger philosophical reference the individual is organic to a universal life or world, of which he is similarly a focus, an organ or expression." In Bergson's words—*Nous ne nous tenons jamais tout entiers*—"We never possess ourselves entirely." This is what Bosanquet means when he insists that "the finite self, like everything in the universe, is now and here beyond escape an element in the Absolute" (*Value and Destiny*, p. 257), and Professor Pringle-Pattison translates this into theological language as meaning that "no act of creation is conceivable or possible which should extrude us from the life of God and place us, as solitary units, outside the courses of his being." This, as he reminds us, is the presupposition of all divine visitations of grace and the possibility of our becoming, through redemption, a new creature in Christ Jesus. It is this "indwelling in a larger life"—the fact that we are "open to all the influences of the universe," having our being in something which is larger and vaster than ourselves—which is the key to the concept of the finite individuality as something other than finite. If we are thus "rooted in a wider life," if in God "we live and move and have our being," then we can account for the presence of the Ideal within us.

"Man is by contrast," says Pringle-Pattison, "a finite-infinite being, conscious of finitude only through the presence of an infinite nature within him." This is the old ontological argument of Descartes. It gives us ground for our belief that Values are of the very structure of Reality.

"The presence of the Ideal is the reality of God within us" (p. 246). Hence "the ideal is precisely the most real thing in the world: and those ranges of our experience, such as religion, which are specifically concerned with the ideal, instead of being created as a cloud-cuckoo-land of subjective fancy, may reasonably be accepted as the best interpreters we have of the true nature of reality" (pp. 251-2).

It is well in this connection to recall to mind Mr. Bradley's emphatic testimony to the validity and objective reference of religious experience:

"There is nothing more real," he says, "than what comes in religion . . . the man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks." (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 449.)

We are not, then, isolated units. The presence of ideals of Truth, Beauty, Goodness, witnesses to the fact that man's being is rooted in a larger life—a Reality transcendent above him and immanent within him.

This does not mean, however, that we are simply the organs of a Divine life or the pipes of a cosmic symphony.

It is an undoubted fact that the presence of an ideal within us has no meaning unless we have made it our own by a self-conscious appropriation. There must be the activity of the finite individual in self-identification with the larger life and the nobler purpose, if we are in any sense to be used as channels of grace.

This is fundamental for the preservation of the truth of the relative but real measure of self-determination and freedom on the part of the finite individual in relation both to the universe in which he is and the God whom he worships.

Once we lose hold upon or weaken our grasp of this truth and we fall into Pantheism and are ready to adopt the phraseology of those who, like Mr. Bosanquet, make a special point of speaking of the finite self as an "element" in the Absolute.

Professor Pringle-Pattison draws attention to this phraseology and its significance in the writings of Bradley and Bosanquet (p. 281).

"As Mr. Bradley talks of the finite self as being 'embraced and harmonized' in the Absolute through its being 'suppressed as such,' so Professor Bosanquet speaks of 'the expansion and absorption of the self.'"

With more audacious irony Mr. Bradley speaks of the perfection and harmony which the individual attains in the Absolute as "the complete gift and dissipation of his 'personality' in which 'he, as such, must vanish.' . . ."

"'Transmuted' is the word favoured by both; but synonyms plentifully scattered through *Appearance and Reality* are 'merged,' 'blended,' 'fused,' 'absorbed,' 'run together,' 'transformed,' 'dissolved in a higher unity,' and even the more sinister terms 'suppressed,' 'destroyed,' and 'lost.'"

It is clear that the adjectival theory of finite individuality is not simply "the denial of unrelated reals." Phraseology such as Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet insist on using clearly implies that in their view "finite individuality" has no intrinsic value such as would justify our claiming permanence for it in the ultimate issue. The main purpose of finite in-

dividuality lies in the contribution it can make to the values which survive in the Absolute. When its contribution is made, the finite real has no more significance: it is not an end in itself but a means, a channel, an instrument. Individuality is not an end in itself, but its meaning lies in its " contribution " to the Whole.

Professor Pringle-Pattison draws attention to the fact that Professor Bosanquet carefully avoids the term " member " and pointedly substitutes the phrase " element " when speaking of the relation between the self and the Absolute.

What is the significance of this ? Simply, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says, because " the idea of membership suggests another conception of the nature and function of individuation than that which dominates Mr. Bradley's and Professor Bosanquet's metaphysics."

" Element in the Absolute ": " Member of a Community." Here we have the difference. " Parts of an Impersonal Whole": " Souls in relationship to a Personal God." Here we detect the issue at stake.

Does our value lie in the " contribution " we make to the Whole ? Granted that it does: the question, then, is: What is our contribution ? The Christian answer is " Ourselves."

God values not my gifts but myself. Love loves the giver and the gift, not for its value, but as the expression of a relationship between Giver and Receiver.

Here at last we reach the meaning and value of the finite individuality. It consists in its relationship to Another. Relationship is of the very texture of Reality. Our end is not final absorption or annihilation, because if it were so relationship between ourselves and the Absolute would cease. We are not dealing with an Impersonal Something for which relationship has no meaning and communion no reality. We cannot express the thought better than in Professor Pringle-Pattison's words:

" It takes two only to make a bargain; it takes two to love and to be loved, two to worship and to be worshipped, and many combined in a common purpose to form a society or a people. . . . As in the love of man and woman, as in a great friendship the completest identification of interests and aims does not merge the friends in one; the most perfect *alter* ego must remain an *alter* if the experience is to exist, if the joy of an intensified life is to be tasted at all " (p. 289).

Now apply this to the relationship between the soul and God. . . . If we are mere modes of the Divine Being, phases of the Divine Life, parts of the One Substance, where is the place for worship, communion, prayer, intercourse, relationship ?

"The religious attitude—all that we mean by worship, adoration, self-surrender—is wholly impossible, if the selves are conceived as telephone wires along which the Absolute acts or thinks. . . .

"That sublime acquiescence, that ardour of self-identification with the spirit of the universe, is possible only to beings who are more than mere modes of a divine substance—whose prerogative it rather is to become the sons of God" (p. 291).

"I note the common refuge of semi-pluralist reasonings in admitting that finite individuals are inter-related, but only *in some degree* determined by inter-relatedness. To me this seems an evasion." So Professor Bosanquet expresses his disapproval of a position short of Pluralism with its unrelated reals, and he refers to Professor Pringle-Pattison (*Idea of God*, p. 274); Professor Stout (p. 21); and Professor Parker (*Self and Nature*, p. 246 *ff.*) as upholders of the *via media*. This is crucial for the theistic position of the finite in relation to God. We claim a real freedom in some measure over against the Whole. "It is meant to suggest," says Professor Bosanquet, "a crowd of co-ordinate individual reals, like Herbart's, entering into relations which are secondary to their private being. But these co-ordinate reals are pure assumptions. There is nothing in experience to suggest drawing a line between inter-relatedness and non-relatedness: and the plain fact is that of super- and subordinate reals."

We should say that there is nothing in experience to suggest unrelated reals and everything to suggest inter-relatedness.

Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison would both accept the term adjectival; to the one, however, it means subordination, to the other co-ordination—the difference being further accentuated by Professor Bosanquet's defining subordination as "the character of being something which has its main being and value as a qualification of a whole which includes it" (*Symposium*, p. 85). (Professor Stout deals further with this point: *Symposium*, p. 133.) What is the "teleological status of finite spirits in the universe"? Professor Bosanquet says he rejected the term "membership," because he thought it would commit him to the idea of "eternal substances, differentiations of the absolute, identified with finite selves." He could not bring himself to hold "finite selves to be necessarily eternal or everlasting units."

Professor Pringle-Pattison's view that the chief end and aim of the Absolute is the development of or into finite spirits is rejected. "I cannot believe," says Professor Bosanquet, "that the supreme end of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be."

Discussing the crucial problem of human freedom, Professor Bosanquet is right when he says "it is only in a will above my own that I can find my own will and my freedom and independence." But he adds a significant comment: "Here, again, it is only by acknowledging myself adjectival and under necessity that I can become substantive and free."

"A man is free," he tells us, "in so far as he wills the universal object. The reason is obvious. It is only what is universal that is free from self-contradiction. It is only what is free from self-contradiction that can be willed without obstruction."

Granted the familiar paradox so true in the moral and spiritual life where we apprehend true freedom only in obedience to the will of Him *cui servire est libertas*, the point is that the act of subordination in obedience is our voluntary act, a free self-determination only possible in a being free to self-determine itself, *i.e.* in a finite centre of free creative activity, what we are contending for when we postulate a substantive and not an adjectival self in relation to God.

If this be not so we have no explanation of the facts of sin and evil. The existence of Will in the individual is the crux of the position. How can we be found in opposition to God unless we be free to be so? "How can I take up this attitude of opposition" (asks Pringle-Pattison, replying to Bosanquet: *Symposium*, p. 115), "if I have not some kind of existence over against the spirit of the whole, if there is not some otherness in the relation between us? . . . the surrender of the selfish will implies the power to assert it: where is the merit or value in the self-surrender if the whole process is a make-believe on the part of the Absolute? If the Absolute is the only agent in the case, how can it will anything *but* the universal?"

The fact is that "belief in the relative independence of human personalities and belief in the existence of God as a living Being are bound up together. The reality of both God and man depends on the reality of the difference between them. Thus I interpret the meaning of creation."

There are other lines of thought which are worth recalling to mind as illustrative of this concept of the uniqueness of the finite individual. It is, for example, one of the strong points in the famous Monadology of Leibniz, who strove to maintain both the individuality of the Monads and their essential unity with God by means of the principle of continuity—what he called the "identity of indiscernibles."

The well-known challenge which Leibniz issued to the Prussian courtiers to find two blades of grass alike in the sense of being identical serves to recall to our minds what is a con-

spicuous principle running through the whole Natural World, even though Science for its own purposes finds it necessary to ignore differences in the effort to classify specimens under ever wider genera.

The bewildering diversity of Nature, the fact that heterogeneity is its mark, is fundamental when we come to observe the same phenomenon in human life and to realize that no two persons are identical.

It is worth while in this connection to quote an illuminating passage from *Christus Futurus*, p. 317.

"The spirit that gives life," Miss Dougall tells us, "only manifests itself in individuality. This is seen in vegetable and animal life; in human life the individual difference is greatest. We are told that there are no two germs, no two blades of grass alike: this appals the mind and gives dignity to the dust. The use and beauty of this minute diversity we cannot comprehend; but we do know intuitively that humanity would cease to be human, and God cease to be God, if the mill of the universe could turn out two men in mind and heart and will the same."

"Two little children who built their toy bricks always alike would destroy human hope. Two idiots whose senseless habits were alike; two men of genius who produced the same epic, the same oratorio, the same philosophy, . . . would pronounce our final doom. Gloom, endless gloom, would fall upon our hearts if the human duplicate were seen."

Now what is the significance of this principle of heterogeneity when studied in connection with finite individuality? Simply this, as it seems to me, that finite individuality as unique has value. We do right to prize our individuality. It is something which cannot be replaced.

Professor Sorley has brought this out very well in a passage I will quote from the recent Gifford Lectures (*Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 113 *ff.*).

"A man prizes his own individuality, and resents any confusion with another self. 'Very nice young ladies they both are,' said Admiral Croft, 'I hardly know one from the other'; but the young ladies would have resented this divided praise. 'Doubles' usually feel antagonistic to one another. When he is regarded simply as one of a class, as a specimen, a man feels himself robbed of his value; and he therefore sets store by everything which gives him a character of his own and marks him off from the rest of the world. Repetition, too, is distasteful to him, because this also is a generalizing of what he esteems as existing once for all. . . ."

Hence, as Dr. Sorley goes on to show, we dislike the thought that this life is a recurrence of cycles, that we may have to go

through it all a second time. "Value," as he reminds us, "seems to be lost if the 'second turn' is a mere reduplication of the first. . . . When you repeat you generalize, and when you generalize you devaluate."

Individuality, then, has value: its unique character has intrinsic worth as such. We may be thankful that the "human duplicate" has not been discovered. I am I and He is He. The day this ceases to be true and finite selves dissolve into one another, humanity may begin to sing its "Nunc dimittis." Something of value will be lost. The charm of life lies, surely, in its infinite variety, the glory of mankind in the absence of sameness, between James and John, Mary and Martha.

Now can we see a purpose in this principle? Can we attach higher values to a personality active in the sphere of the moral and the spiritual? If we accept the view point of Jesus of Nazareth in His relationships with men, I think we can. And moreover we shall discover a profounder meaning in finite individuality if we strive to view it from His standpoint.

What is His standpoint? That of Love with its sympathetic, may we say, its intuitive insight, into a man's power of a higher becoming—its belief, therefore, in the possibilities of human nature. It is Jesus' theocentric thought of man which gives us the key of which we are in search. We have it in the story of the rich young ruler (Mark x. 17-22): "Jesus, looking upon him, loved him." Love can discern in a man something which escapes the less penetrating gaze of a crowd and so confounds the world's judgment and even the verdict of an intellectualistic philosophical estimate or that of a scientific valuation. How beautifully this has been brought out in Dr. Glover's study: *The Jesus of History*, Chapter VI., "Jesus and Man."

"It is worth noticing that Jesus stands alone in refusing to despair of the greater part of mankind. Contempt was in His eyes the unpardonable sin (Matt. v. 22) . . . the lost soul matters to God. He sums up His own work in the world in much the same language as He uses about the shepherd in the parable: 'The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which is lost' (Luke xix. 10)."

"If, as Dr. D. S. Cairns puts it (writes Dr. Glover), 'Jesus Christ is the great believer in man,' it is—if we are reading him aright at all—because God believes in man." And, again, "Can one out of fifteen hundred millions of human beings living on one planet matter to God, when there are so many planets and stars, and there have been so many generations? Can he matter? It all depends on how we conceive of God. Here it is essential to give all the meaning to the term 'God' that Jesus gave to it, to believe in God as Jesus believed in God,

if we are to understand the fulness of Jesus' 'good news.' It all depends on God—on whether Jesus was right about God; and, after all, on Jesus Himself. 'A thing of price is man,' wrote Synesius about A.D. 410, 'because for him Christ died.' The two things go together—Jesus' death and Jesus' theocentric thought of man."

So far Dr. Glover, and it is beautifully put. It amounts to this, that if we accept Jesus' point of view, man in God's sight—in the sight of Omnipotent Love—is of infinite value. Why? Because "made in the image of God" the Creator discerns the infinite even in the meanest of the sons of men and believes in us because He knows what we are capable of becoming and what He can make us if we will but let Him. We draw out the best in people when we begin to believe in them. We begin to discern their value when we begin to love them. Dr. Glover aptly recalls for us a well-known passage in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*. "Man's unhappiness, as I construe," says Teuffelsdröckh, "comes of his greatness; it is because there is an infinite in him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the finite. Will the Whole Finance Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of Modern Europe undertake in joint-stock company, to make one shoeblack happy?"

The question is thought-provoking and the answer, surely, in the negative. Why? Because even a shoeblack has a soul, and this constitutes his unique value in the eyes of our Heavenly Father who "calleth His own sheep by name."

We move a stage further when we come to consider the relationship of the soul to God. Here the verdict of religious experience is decisive against all attempts to deprecate the meaning and value of finite individuality. Here, if anywhere, we rest our claim to intrinsic worth and permanence. The relationship between the soul and God, God and the Soul in communion is at once the guarantee of (*a*) our uniqueness, and (*b*) our worth. Why? Because we dare to believe that our relationship, *my* particular relationship, intercourse, communion with God, is irreplaceable. No other finite individual self is related to God in this sense in identically the same way. That is to say, that if another soul could conceivably be in my relationship to God it must be myself reduplicated, which it cannot be. I am I, and my relationship to God is *my* relationship and not another's. We dare further to believe that He values my communion with Him because of His Love to me. In this lies my intrinsic worth. Not that I am of value in or for or to myself. This were Egoism run mad. My worth lies in His valuation. This is my justification for claiming a value and a permanence for myself which otherwise I dare not presume to cherish.

"But all the world's coarse thumb
And finger failed to plumb,
So passed in making up the main account;
All instincts immature,
All purposes unsure,
That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man's account.

"Thoughts hardly to be packed
Into a narrow act,
Fancies that broke through language and escaped;
All I could never be,
All, men ignored in me.
This, I was worth to God, Whose wheel the pitcher shaped."

Dr. Mozley has put the thought beautifully in a pregnant sentence: Mankind is *all mass to the human eye, and all individual to the divine* (*Univ. Sermons*, p. 121, sermon on "War," quoted in Pringle-Pattison, p. 268).

We may still further elucidate this principle of the uniqueness of individuals if we appeal to human experience, both in relation to other persons and to God.

However possible or desirable it may be in a democratic age to consider men in the mass or to legislate for the whole, we can never forget the indubitable fact that each man must grow and develop from his own roots, and that character, whatever it may owe to circumstances and environment in its development, is ultimately the result of the activity of the Self. We are the masters of our inner sanctuary. Each man, each child, has a soul to be educated, a life to be developed, and no State legislation or outside pressure is of the least avail apart from the activity, the self-determination of the living Ego of each individual man or woman. If this is true of the æsthetic and the intellectual life, it is pre-eminently true of the moral and the spiritual life. All moral and spiritual progress is dependent upon a battle we fight ourselves, each one. No circumstances, however favourable, no Divine Grace, however powerful, is of any avail to dispense us from the task of self-development. It has well been said that we can never be lost in the mass and float with it, in some easy stream, towards a haven of righteousness. Each life has a separate relation to God, a separate course to follow, a destiny to fulfil. Each individual possesses gifts, be it but the one talent or the five—no one is devoid of all talents, nor is the talent in one life exactly what it is in another. Each one has hopes, aspirations, desires, responsibilities, and is singly tried, proved, crowned, and blessed, or disowned at the last as an individual. We may be saved in the body, and as a member of the body, but it remains true, none the less, that no two experiences of salvation in the vast body of redeemed humanity can ever be identical, and no two persons' trial and testing in temptation are ever the same in the sense of

being identically alike. Hence our inability to take credit for the goodness of others or offer as a substitute for our own the piety of our parents. It is so in all the crises of life. We must pass through the experience with the sympathy, the prayers, the advice, the assistance, the love of others, but none the less alone. There is a passage in Browning's *Paracelsus* which illustrates this point:

PARACELSUS: "Are there not, Festus, are there not, dear Michal,
Two points in the adventure of a diver,
One—when a beggar, he prepares to plunge,
One—when a prince, he rises with his pearl?
Festus, I plunge!"
FESTUS: "We wait you when you rise!"

Now the point is this: What happens under the water is known to God and the diver. The diver's experience is unshareable by any save himself. So in the great crises of life; the thing that opens our eyes to Reality is just this awful isolation of the self—the sorrow none can share, the dark night in which we are alone, the sin which is essentially mine, my fault, my own fault, my own most grievous fault, the sense of guilt, that awful guardian of my personal identity (as Inge puts it). Individually we are baptized, individually we partake of the Heavenly Manna, though we kneel in the Presence and as members of a great multitude whom no man can number. "O God, Thou art My God" is still our cry—God and the Soul, the Soul and God—two great realities, two beings in the whole universe. And if this isolation of the self in the midst of its manifold relatedness to others and to God be true of life, it is pre-eminently true of the culminating crisis of life when we come to the gate of death. Watch a dying person and we are in the presence of a trial we cannot share with them. We are onlookers at a struggle which the dying person must go through each for himself.

"Why should we faint and fear to live alone
Since all alone we die?
Not e'en the tenderest heart and next our own
Knows half the reasons why we smile and sigh."

Thus does life and its crises bear out the principle of the uniqueness of the finite individuality of each self, and the Divine appeal is never to the mass but to the individual man. The Divine Voice is heard in the depths of the individual soul and the summons answered by each one as an individual response.

Mankind is *all mass to the human eye, and all individual to the divine* (Mozley).

So we reach the question of Personal Immortality.

H. MAURICE RELTON.

THE ORIGIN AND FALL OF MAN

(Continued)

In the first of these articles we examined the problem of man's ancestry in the light of recent scientific investigation. We have now to consider the theological aspect of the conclusions at which we have arrived. Modern anthropological research has established the theory of the evolution of the human race from a common precursor, and it has done much, in conjunction with anatomy, to show the lines upon which the mind of man developed. The Bible, on the other hand, opens with an explanation of the problems of creation, the origin of man and of evil, the beginning of social organization, and the distribution of races, which has been drawn largely from contemporary folklore. The caves and rocks had not yet revealed their secret when the opening chapters of Genesis were written. The primitive mind asked, "Whence came man?" "How does he differ from the beasts?" Such questions as these were answered with childlike wisdom and fascinating spirituality, freed from the crude and gross mythologies of those who "had not the fear of God before their eyes." The book of Genesis was written to teach religious truth, and to this end human tradition was made the vehicle for bringing home to the minds of its original readers certain spiritual realities. Matters that are discoverable by human reason, and the means of investigation which God has placed within the reach of man's faculties, are not the proper subjects of Divine revelation, any more than the material facts of nature are the concern of revealed religion.

According to the narrative in Genesis, man (in the persons of Adam and Eve) was created in the image and likeness of his Maker, and originally lived in a state of childlike innocence in Eden, the abode of God, knowing no more than children know. There every tree that was pleasant to the sight and good for food grew abundantly; there the animals lived at peace with man and with each other; there man and woman were ignorant of concupiscence. In the midst of the garden grew the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and God had forbidden man to eat of its fruit, saying, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Into this blissful paradise the crafty serpent crept, and persuaded the woman to eat of the forbidden fruit, and she gave of it to her husband, and he ate it also. No sooner had they partaken of it than the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked, and made them-

selves aprons of fig-leaves. The age of innocence was past. Adam and Eve had risen by this simple act from the age of childhood to that of reason and experience (Deut. i. 39; 2 Sam. xix. 35; Isa. vii. 15). In the cool of the evening God walked in Eden as was His custom, but the man and the woman hid themselves in shame among the trees. He called them forth and passed sentence upon them and the serpent, and thrust Adam and Eve from their lost paradise. Thus, by gaining knowledge, man fell from grace.

While a similar story of the fall and the origin of death is to be found among many primitive people,* there is no exact parallel in Babylonian mythology to the Hebrew legend. In the Gilgamesh epic, one of the oldest Semitic legends, a serpent is represented as stealing from Gilgamesh a plant which "would make an old man young again,"† and in another Babylonian myth Adapa (or, according to Sayce, Adamu or Adam‡) is said to have been offered the food of life and the water of life by Anu. Having been previously warned by his creator Ea that he would be offered the food and water of death, he refused them, and so missed the gift of immortality. In the legend of Enki-du as given in Tablet I. of the Gilgamesh epic, man (Enki-du) was formed out of clay by Aruru in the image of Anu, the head of the Babylonian pantheon, and remained with the beasts of the fields. This is perhaps a reflection of the animals being reviewed and named by Adam in the Genesis story. Both Adam and Enki-du chose woman to be their helpmate and life-companion, to their undoing. In the case of the latter the man was enticed to Erech by his wife, Samḫat, while in the Biblical narrative it was Eve who persuaded Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit. In the Enki-du story, however, the serpent does not occur, though it is possible that there is a connection between *Havvà* (the Hebrew form of the name Eve) and an Aramaic word meaning "serpent."§ Be this as it may, Jastrow is apparently correct in connecting the whole of the older Genesis story and the fall with the legend of Enki-du as given in the Gilgamesh epic.‖ The serpent may very likely be a later insertion in the narrative, the original form of which represented the woman as the tempter, as in the Babylonian legend. The fact that the Yahwistic writer assumes that the original occupation of man was agriculture shows that the story did not originate among the Hebrews, although the colouring is certainly Palestinian, fertility being represented as

* Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the O.T.* (London, 1918), vol. i., pp. 52 ff.
† L. W. King, *Babylonian Religion and Mythology* (London, 1899), pp. 173 f.
‡ *The Expository Times*, vol. xvii., p. 416.
§ Skinner, Gen. iii. 20, *Intern. Crit. Comm.*
‖ *American Journal of Semitic Languages*, vol. xv., 1899, pp. 195 ff.

dependent on rain sent down from heaven, and not, as in Babylonia, on the overflowing of rivers (Gen. vi. 5).

It is not, however, with the origin of the biblical narrative of the Creation and Fall of man that we are here primarily concerned. Our object is rather to determine how far the doctrine that has grown out of the story is tenable in the light of modern anthropological research regarding man's origin and evolution. In the Synoptic Gospels our Lord nowhere alludes to Gen. iii., and in St. John viii. 44, when the devil is described as a murderer from the beginning, it is clear from the parallel in St. John iii. 8 ff., that the allusion is not to the origin of death by sin, but to the murder of Abel. It is in the writings of St. Paul that we first encounter in the New Testament the doctrine of sin and redemption based on Gen. iii. (1 Cor. xv. 21 f.; Rom. v. 12 ff.; *cf.* Rom. xvi. 20, 2 Cor. xi. 3, v. 14). In 1 Cor. xv. 21 ff. Adam is represented as the head of Fallen Mankind, while Christ is the head of the Redeemed Race: "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive." The first man made of the earth, the ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χϊκός, cannot as such be immortal. "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God," because they are essentially corruptible. Immortality belongs to the supernatural order, and, therefore, our corruptible nature must be raised to that level by union with Christ, if we are to be partakers in the resurrection of the dead. "As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." In Rom. v. 12 ff. the Apostle again compares the first and second Adams, this time in connection with sin and righteousness. "As through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," so "the grace of God, and the gift by grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, abound unto the many." This somewhat confused passage has been variously interpreted by theologians, but it seems clear that St. Paul here maintains that the whole race has become involved in the sin committed by the first man. "For as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous." The serpent as the origin of evil, which figures so conspicuously in the apocryphal and apocalyptic literature (cf. 2 Esdras), has no place in the Pauline doctrine of the Fall, though it recurs in Rev. xii. 9 and xx. 2. For him Redemption rather than the Fall is the centre to which the attention must be focussed. It is therefore with the remedy and not with the origin of sin that he is primarily concerned. "The wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord."

The interpretations put upon St. Paul's language by the Church in subsequent ages are various. The Patristic commentaries on the stories of Creation and the Fall largely follow Jewish precedents. They often allegorize the original narrative with legendary additions, while in the Gnostic cosmologies Adam becomes an Æon.* The Ophites speak of the "spiritual seed" (ὀὲοω ἄνθρωπος) as an efflux ἀπὲ τον ἄρχανθρώπον ἄνωθεν Ἀδαμάτος,† Greek equivalents of the Adam Qadmon or Adam Elyon which figure in the Qabbālā. Both these ideas are unquestionably developments from Rabbinical mysticism. To the Greek, unlike the Latin, the supreme evil from which man needs to be delivered is not guilt, but corruption. Through sin, humanity becomes subject to the law of death. To transform this corrupt and mortal nature into the likeness of the Divine life, Christ became man; "He became what we are, that He might make us what He is."‡ To St. Athanasius the Incarnation is the great act of Redemption, the death of Christ being merely an incident in the process. Speaking broadly, the Greek view was simply that the original righteousness of the race was lost through Adam's sin, the consequences of the Fall being a *privatio* (of the supernatural gift of original righteousness) leaving the will unimpaired. Latin theology took over from the Greeks the conception of salvation through the Incarnation; but, in contrast to the Greeks, the Latins, following Augustine, regarded the Fall as a *depravatio naturæ*. The human will is disabled, "natural righteousness" is annihilated, and therefore man is wholly corrupt.§ From this view mediæval and Protestant theologians, especially Calvin, developed the doctrine of original sin,|| but this conception of the Fall is now held only by certain Protestant sects. We may therefore regard the milder Greek doctrine rather than the harsh Augustinian view, as representative of the Catholic attitude towards the Fall of man.

Now is it impossible, in the light of modern scientific knowledge, to hold what we may call the "Catholic theory" of the Fall? Are there any grounds for believing that man, in the beginning, was differentiated from the rest of creation by having a consciousness of, and communion with, the Deity, and that he was endowed with free will? Unless it can be proved that he was in possession of these two specifically human "faculties," it is obviously impossible to regard the Fall as in any sense an historical fact. On the other hand, if the religious

* Harvey's *Irenæus*, vol. i., p. 224, n. 1. † *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 134, n. 2.

‡ *Irenæus, adv. Hær.*, v.; *cf.* Athanasius' tract on the Incarnation in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, second series, vol. iv., pp. 36 ff.

§ *De Trinitate*, Book XII., *X.-XV.*; *cf.* Scott Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement* (London, 1901), pp. 435 ff.

|| *Cf.* Calvin, *Institutes*, Book II., ch. i., 5.

sense is a part of the original constitution of the human organism and if man was a moral being, knowing the difference between "right" and "wrong," there are no *a priori* reasons for rejecting the doctrine on scientific grounds.

First, as regards the origin of the religious sense, it has been conclusively proved by the evidence of ceremonial interments in the mid-Palæolithic period that man, in the Mousterian culture phase, believed in a life after death. On no other hypothesis can the care be explained with which the skeleton found at La Chapelle-aux-Saintes in 1907 was surrounded with flint implements, red ochre, and bones of various animals, some of which were split doubtless in order that in the future life the marrow might be ready for use. This was undoubtedly a ceremonial interment, accompanied by offerings of food and implements for the use of the deceased in the spirit-world.* A similar burial was found in the rock-shelter of Le Moustier† and at La Ferrassie.‡ The fact that these interments with funerary rites have been so circumstantially carried out suggests that they were founded on an already established cult of the dead. It may therefore be concluded that man, in the Mousterian phase of the Palæolithic age, believed in a life after death. Since the conception of immortality belongs to that aspect of mental development which may be called religious consciousness, it follows that the religious sense had evolved among the Neanderthalers who inhabited the French caves in the mid-Palæolithic. But, as we have already pointed out, the brain of Neanderthal Man was infinitely inferior to that of *Eoanthropus*. Therefore, if we are compelled to grant the religious "faculty" to Cave Man, it seems difficult, on anatomical grounds, to deny it to the earlier Piltdown race, who possessed a brain resembling in a great many respects that of modern man.

But what is meant by the religious faculty? Obviously the existence of both magic and religion depends upon a mental development which is peculiar to man. As we have seen, the emergence of the human race apparently came about by the coincident development of four lines of structural evolution, in which the fundamental factor was the growth and specialization of the brain. Many of the higher animals are capable of exercising such emotional reactions as love, hate, shame, fear, etc.; but they are unable to enter into systematic relations with invisible powers, owing to the absence of abstract or "free" ideas—*i.e.*, ideas appearing in the mind in the absence of the objects to which they owe their origin, or to which they refer. They cannot conceive the existence of abstract objects or forces,

* *L'Anthropologie*, 1913, vol. xxiv., pp. 609-634.
† *Arch. für Anthrop.*, 1909, vol. vii., pp. 287-297.
‡ *Revue Scientifique*, 1910, vol. xlviii., p. 193.

whereas in man all his attributes, moral, practical, or emotional, as well as religious, are due to "objects" of his consciousness, the things which he believes to exist, really or ideally, along with but external to himself. In primitive cult, as, indeed, in many forms of higher religion, the visible plays an important part in bringing man into touch with the invisible. Nevertheless, it is belief in an unseen power that leads man to the performance of ritual acts. The members of a totem in Central Australia, for instance, solemnly gather at a sacred spot to partake ceremonially of the species with which they believe themselves to be in mystic union, in order that through the rite they may receive the *mana* (the mystic impersonal force pervading sacred objects) resident in the totem. Animals, on the other hand, so far as can be ascertained, have no realm of the invisible, no universe of abstract objects. They merely express the emotion of fear at any unusual phenomenon: but man, having developed more complex mental processes, explains the mysterious in terms of the supernatural.

There can be little doubt that it was the instinctive fear of harmless objects which gave rise in man to his earliest religious conceptions. The attitude of mind which causes animals and birds to abandon their haunts when misfortune or death befalls their fellows, in the higher mental development which is peculiar to man, leads to the notion of a mysterious power, an unseen influence attaching itself to any extraordinary or uncanny object. Psychologically the religious sense manifests itself on the emotional side before the mind is capable of forming definite notions like gods and spirits. Any object arousing the emotion of awe or wonder is regarded by primitive man as containing the mystic impersonal force called by the Melanesians *mana*. A curiously shaped stone implement, certain parts of animals, relics of the head, an uncanny spot, or terrorizing phenomena, would be calculated to set in motion feelings of mystery, fear, and reverence which would lead to notions of the *supernatural*, and thus act as a powerful stimulus to the dawning religious consciousness. When primeval man was only concerned with non-human objects—rocks, trees, rivers, etc. —the generic term *mana* probably covers his attitude towards the supernatural. But when he could not identify the unknown power with any material object, then he may have been driven to a belief in spiritual beings to explain such awe-inspiring phenomena as dreams, trances, death, shadows, etc. Again, if he could not associate the mystic power with any material or spiritual force, then in all probability he would be led to a belief in an All-Father who lived in the sky, perhaps remote from the world he created, but full of knowledge and power. Such a

Being is *Daramulun* of the Yuin tribe in South-East Australia, whose voice is heard in the thunder calling on the rain to fall and make everything grow up new, and who, in consequence, very early became associated with the bull-roarer.*

This belief in High Gods among low races is now generally recognized by anthropologists as an integral part of primitive cult,† and although Tylor suggested that it was due to missionary influence the fact that in Australia the belief can be proved to have existed before Christianity made itself felt in the country renders this explanation impossible.‡ In the Central area, except in the case of such Beings as *Atnatu*, All-Fathers have become mere bogeys to frighten women and children. But disbelief presupposes the existence of the belief in former times. Among the Bantu in Africa there is a similar tendency to degeneration from the more lofty ideas associated with the All-Father belief, while among the Dinka, the High God *Dengdit*, who created the world and established the order of things, has retained a much more prominent position in the cult of the tribe.§ Among other primitive people who believe in Supreme Beings are the Andaman Islanders, the Melanesians, the Todas, Yorubans, Samoans, Maoris, etc.

As soon as human consciousness appeared in all probability this search after a higher power began. A mystic force seemed to pervade nature and men alike, and therefore man was driven to believe in some supernatural power that had to do with both the external world and his inner consciousness. In the earliest stages of culture these two aspects were undoubtedly closely related. True, the High God who answers to the spiritual requirements of the savage is not now generally worshipped by offerings or addressed by prayers, though it is possible that at one time he was the recipient of "worship."‖

It appears from Mrs. Parker's evidence from the Euahlayi tribe in Australia, that prayers were at one time offered to Baiame,¶ and the Southern Dinka supplicate their god *Dengdit* with prayers and hymns in times of drought, sickness, and tempest, and make offerings to him at certain shrines.** According to Jevons's hypothesis both the *Intichiuma*†† and Initiation

* Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia* (London, 1904), pp. 494 ff.

† A. Lang, *The Making of Religion* (London, 1898); Article "God" (Prim.), Hastings' *ERE*; Marett, *The Threshold of Religion* (London, 1914), pp. 147 ff.; E. O. James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief* (London, 1917), pp. 187 ff.

‡ *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, pp. 194 f. § Article "Dinka," Hasting's *ERE*.

‖ Jevons, *Introd. to Study of Comp. Rel.* (London, 1908), p. 101; *cf.* 31 ff.; *cf. Religion in Evolution* (London, 1914), p. 14.

¶ *Euahlayi Tribe* (London, 1905), pp. 5 ff.; *cf.* James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, pp. 199 f. ** Hastings' *ERE*, "Dinka."

†† Ceremonies held in the spring and autumn by the Arunta tribe in Central Australia to make the food-animals and food-plants multiply and prosper. The autumn rites consist of a sacramental meal in which the members of the totem partake of their sacred ally.

rites in Australia are descended from a ritual in which the doctrine taught was belief in the All-Father, and in which the rites observed consisted in a sacrifice or sacramental meal. Survivals of such a belief are certainly not altogether lacking in the initiation ceremonies, and it may be conjectured that the ceremonial eating of the totem animal or plant was originally associated with the All-Father belief. If totemism has survived conspicuously in the *Intichiuma* rites, it also survives in the instruction of the boys when they are initiated into the tribal totemic mysteries over which the All-Father presides in the South-East tribes. Thus totemism is a common feature of both *Intichiuma* and Initiation ceremonies, and there is no *a priori* reason why there should not be some system of ritual and belief from which both are derived. There can be no doubt that the present-day explanation of the *Intichiuma* ceremonies does not describe the original purpose of the rites. It is therefore not improbable that Jevons is correct in supposing that in very remote times it was the All-Father who presided over a primitive sacrificial meal much in the same way as *Daramulun* is now the God of the Mysteries among the coastal tribes of South-East Australia.

Be this as it may, there can be little doubt that the belief in High Gods takes us back to the very earliest stages of religious development. The association of these Beings with the instrument known as the bull-roarer among primitive people to-day* suggests (as it seems to us) a very probable origin of the All-Father belief. Nothing would be calculated to arouse emotions of awe more strongly in the dawning religious consciousness than the roll of thunder accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning and torrential rainfall. The havoc wrought by thunderstorms, especially in tropical districts, would greatly add to the terror of those beholding the scene, and the fact that the tempest very often may have been followed by fires, would doubtless suggest to primeval man that the whole phenomenon was a stupendous supernatural intervention, initiated by a Supreme Power outside the world.

The conception of an external Creator does not presuppose a degree of intelligence above that reached by man in the beginning of the early Stone Age. The idea of a great Maker of the universe may be safely attributed to men who were capable of forming an animistic conception of the soul. Among surviving races no tribes are known who are incapable of this belief, and it appears very early in the mental development of the child.

* A. C. Haddon, *The Study of Man* (London, 1898), pp. 327 ff.; *cf.* Howitt, *op. cit.*, p. 629; *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 154 ff.; Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 497.

The first definite enquiries about cause are usually made towards the end of the second year, while the notion of a personal Creator arises somewhat later. Psychologically, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that the primeval mind was unable to conceive of High Gods. That the All-Father should often be thought of as having human attributes is not surprising since men rather than animals are the constructors and controllers of inanimate things. Man makes the houses in which he lives, the implements he uses, and regulates society by certain laws; and therefore it would appear that it must have been a "magnified non-natural man" who made the first weapons and the tribal laws and customs. At first he may have stood in a definite relationship to his creatures, until, in process of time, sacred objects assumed personal characteristics, either by direct personification or by fusion with the All-Father belief. Then the High God may have degenerated into a dim, shadowy form, intimately associated with the bull-roarer (the "buzz" of which resembles thunder), his worship having been eclipsed by that of the totems, spirits, or ancestors. These lesser Beings were worshipped by offerings and addressed by prayer because they were regarded as more approachable than the great All-Father who dwelt in the sky, but in the beginning it may well have been that a paternal relationship existed between man and the Creator.

Let us now apply these conclusions to the doctrine of the Fall as it was held by the Greek theologians. That primeval man was apparently capable of formulating a belief in a Supreme Being in answer to certain external stimuli shows that he was endowed with a religious consciousness. How this "revelation" was made known to him it is impossible to determine, but, judging from the anthropological evidence, it would appear that the dawning spiritual sense was gradually awakened by the emotion of awe and wonder at that which the mind could not fully comprehend. At first the mysterious may have been interpreted in terms of a mystic impersonal force (*mana*) which took over a more *personal* guise when the unknown power could not be associated with material objects. But whatever may have been the first attempt of the soul of man to reach out to the supernatural, it seems clear that the conception of an external Creator arose very early. Crude and anthropomorphic as the primeval notions of the Deity must have been, they were, perhaps, of a more lofty nature than those of the Australian backfellow to-day, since the cult of the latter is known to be in a state of degeneration.

If Jevons's view is correct, primeval man did hold communion with his God, though, of course, in a primitive manner, much as the native to-day enters into mystic sacramental

relations with his totem. But we must never forget that children and childlike people are capable of profound spiritual experiences, and it may well have been that when man first emerged from his animal ancestry the dawning religious consciousness was really conscious of the Deity in a fuller sense than in later times. Everyone who has had "parochial experience" knows perfectly well that the simplest folk are often capable of the most extraordinary spirituality, that God reveals to "babes and sucklings" things that are hidden from the "wise and prudent." Thus Dom Louismet, in his little volume on *The Mystical Life** says, "Many lead the mystical life unawares, and sometimes are very far advanced in it without suspecting that God is doing very great things in them, or realizing that theirs is the mystical life. I have found such in all walks of life, notably among the poor and little children and among illiterate persons, and even among the savage tribes of North America." If *Eoanthropus* is at all typical of primeval man, there is no reason, on anatomical grounds, to deny the possibility of early man having a real consciousness of, and communion with, the All-Father upon whom he depended for his existence. Moreover, the fact that there was a tendency to degeneration in Palæolithic times is shown by the marked cranial inferiority of the Neanderthal type of mankind inhabiting Europe in the Cave period.

So far, then, as the anthropological evidence goes, the theologian has little to fear if he postulates a religious consciousness as part of the original endowment of the human race. Beyond this science cannot go. When we proceed farther and enter upon an enquiry into the possibility of a "primitive revelation" and a "fall from a state of original righteousness," we leave the domain of science and pass into that of theology.

In the space at our disposal it is impossible to do justice to these important and highly technical theological problems. Furthermore, since the purpose of this article is to examine the traditional view of the Origin and Fall of Man in the light of recent scientific research, they hardly come within the range of our enquiry. Suffice it to say that revelation, being the process by which God makes known to man certain spiritual truths, merely presupposes, on the scientific side, the existence of a being endowed with sufficient intelligence to receive and make use of knowledge imparted to him. Since primeval man appears to have been essentially a religious being, with some desire for union and communion with his god, there is no *prima facie* reason for rejecting the possibility of a primitive revelation. Primeval man, like the modern savage, was faced with the

* London, 1918, p. 8.

practical problems of life. To meet these needs he would doubtless desire to make use of a power and knowledge greater than his own. Thus he would be led to seek supernatural aid and " heavenly wisdom " to enable him to go on life's journey with hope and confidence. Believing that such material blessings as abundant harvest, success in the chase, and victory in war are dependent upon the good hand of his god upon him, he desires to know what is required of him that these good relations may continue. It was, in all probability, from practical reasons of this nature, that the desire for revelation first made itself felt. Men were made to seek God and feel after Him if haply they might find Him. As man rose to a higher conception of life, deeper needs and loftier notions moved the soul to reach out to and make itself one with its God.

How far this search after spiritual things has been hindered by a fall from original righteousness it is difficult to say. That a time arrived when man's faculties were sufficiently developed for him to become conscious of a moral law, and that having become conscious of it he broke it is surely beyond question. This, of course, does not imply that primeval man had any lofty conception of sin in the theological sense of the word. Among primitive people to-day moral sanction is external rather than internal. The conduct of savages is best understood in terms of " the psychology of the crowd." Their standard of right and wrong is social rather than individual, and their morality is a customary morality determined by the forces of social suggestion. The function of religion, regarded as a sanction, is to inoculate the Good by investing it with sacredness. The evolution of the idea of the sacred consists largely in the differentiation of that which is both sacred and good from that which is sacred and bad. Herein lies the fundamental difference between magic and religion, religion being concerned with the mystically good, magic with the mystically bad (*i.e.*, mystical means used for anti-social ends). Closely associated with this conception of sacredness is the notion of *tabu* (a Polynesian word roughly equivalent to the Latin *sacer*), which is the motive behind most magico-religious prohibitions. In process of time this ceremonial aversion develops into the idea of a purity of heart as the realization of the fact of sin, in a theological sense, becomes more and more apparent. But while right and wrong, as we understand the terms to-day, are undoubtedly products of riper human experience, yet we cannot deny to primeval man a " knowledge of good and evil " in the primitive sense of the words.

The emergence of the human race marks the first appearance of moral beings in the world. Man was differentiated from his ancestry by the possession of a spiritual nature and a free will, but, alas! only to his undoing. It was doubtless the

purpose of God that the highest of His creatures should continue in a state of "original righteousness," and develop spiritually, just as the body and mind were destined to become perfected by evolution. But no sooner had the first men learnt to discriminate between good and evil than they deliberately chose the evil and refused the good, thereby falling from "grace." Presumably the first actual "sin" was a group or tribal offence, such as is common among primitive people to-day; but whatever it may have been, it awoke in the human mind all the "warring passions" which were calculated to deprive him of a Divinely assisted growth in spirituality. So we find that instead of his having a more complete knowledge of his Maker as his mental capacity increased, he regarded the Deity as a remote All-Father, and often a mere myth or bogey. All the crude and grotesque rites which characterize primitive religion are a visible witness to the vain strivings of the human mind after its God. Nevertheless, that the human heart in all ages has yearned for union with its Maker,* shows that the Fall was a *privatio* and not a *depravatio naturæ*. The study of comparative religion reveals a permanent element of truth—a progressive revelation—in all stages of religious evolution, but it is an arrested development. But if there had been no Fall we may surmise that a fuller revelation would have been vouchsafed to the dawning religious consciousness (such as was given by our Lord in His parabolic teaching) and that man would not have been left to follow his vain imaginations in his search after God. Be this as it may, the biblical narrative of the origin of the soul and of the Fall undoubtedly sets forth, in an allegorical dressing, profound theological truths. While it would be ridiculous to attach historical significance to the actual legends, regarded as parables, they describe the vicissitudes through which the spiritual nature in man has passed in terms which modern scientific research can hardly gainsay. Man, in the beginning, had a religious consciousness which was capable of conceiving the notion of an external Creator. He also had the knowledge of good and evil, with the result that he was a moral being, and therefore he was responsible for his actions. The first tribal or group sin presumably constituted the Fall and may have led to the degeneration of his spiritual sense by the withdrawal of the Divine impetus which would otherwise have led to a complete revelation of the majesty of his Maker. In the non-Christian religions we see fallen man striving after the Deity. Christianity is God's response, of redemption even more than of revelation, to those who have tried and failed to redeem themselves.

E. O. James.

* *Cf. Primitive Ritual and Belief.*

THE EPICLESIS

In a discussion of the epiclesis question there are two classes of evidence from which conclusions may be drawn: (1) Passages in the works of various writers, often tolerable of more than one interpretation, but which have the advantage that they can be dated with more or less accuracy; and (2) liturgical forms, which are usually clear in their meaning, but whose earliest date is too often only a matter of conjecture.

The earliest writer (after those of the New Testament) who treats of the subject is Justin Martyr, towards the middle of the second century. He described the Eucharistic Prayer as consisting of praise and glory to the Father, and a thanksgiving, at some length, for our being counted worthy to receive these things, to which the people answer, *Amen* (1 *Apol.* lxv.). In the next chapter he describes the food (which is the flesh and blood of Jesus) as having been "blessed by the prayer-logos which is from him" (*i.e.*, from Christ). The same phrase appears in chapter xiii., where Justin speaks of "praising God to the utmost of our power by the logos of prayer and thanksgiving for all things wherewith we are provided." In both cases the phrase "logos of prayer" seems most naturally to mean the "form of prayer." An objection is raised that in chapter lxvi. there is a parallelism which would be destroyed by such an interpretation: Jesus Christ became incarnate through the logos of God; bread and wine become Christ's flesh and blood through the logos of prayer. But the parallelism is in the wording, not in identity of meaning; it would be necessary to translate "through the prayer of the Logos" to keep the latter, and then the parallelism would be lost. It is probable that in the rite described by Justin (whether of Rome or Asia Minor is uncertain), the epiclesis was for the coming of the Divine Logos to effect the change; for he regards the Incarnation as effected by the Second Person of the Holy Trinity Himself, and not, as we are now accustomed to do, by the instrumentality of the Third Person (cap. xlvi., lxvi.).

Irenæus, the next witness, says that "the bread, receiving the epiclesis of God, is the Eucharist" (Lib. IV., cap. xviii., § 5); again, that "the mingled cup and the bread receives the logos of God, and becomes the Eucharist of the blood and body of Christ" (V., ii., 3 *bis*). That these two expressions mean the same appears fairly certain. That they do not refer to the words, *This is My body, this is My blood*, is suggested by a later passage (V., xxxiii., 1) where Christ is said to have given thanks

while holding the cup, then to have drunk of it, then to have given it to His disciples, and said, " Drink ye all of this," etc. Another passage speaks of " the bread over which thanks have been given " as " the body of the Lord " (IV., xviii., 4). A further change of phrase is found in the description of the imitation Eucharist of Marcus, the Valentinian Gnostic, apparently with an invocation of Charis (as in the *Didache*), wherein he for his own purposes " protracted to great length the logos of the epiclesis." Here *logos* can only mean the *formula* of invocation. Irenæus has a clearer grasp of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost than had Justin, and seems to interpret " Holy Spirit " of St. Luke i. 35 as the Third Person, and not the Second, as Justin does (III., xxi., 4, but see also V., i., 3). If *logos of God*, *logos of the epiclesis*, *epiclesis of God*, and *the thanksgiving* are equivalent phrases, they can only denote the Eucharistic prayer, and throw no light on the nature of the invocation in it, though witnessing to the existence of such a constituent therein.

Origen, in the middle half of the third century, says that " we give thanks to the Creator of everything, and eat the loaves, which have been offered with thanksgiving and prayer over the gifts, and become through the prayer a certain holy thing which hallows them that make use of it with sincere purpose " (*contra Cels.*, VIII., xxxiii. *ad finem*). In his commentary on St. Matthew xi. 14 he uses the Pauline phrase, " the Eucharist is hallowed through the logos of God and prayer "; and farther on adds that " it is not the substance of the bread, but the logos said over it which benefits ' the worthy communicant,' " where *logos* can only signify a form of words. In another homily (in 1 Cor. vii. 5) he designates the Eucharist as the bread " on which has been invoked the name of God and of Christ and of the Holy Ghost." From this it might be concluded that Origen was accustomed to an epiclesis of all three Persons of the Trinity on the elements; but this need not follow, since Cyril of Jerusalem, who usually describes the invocation of his rite as one for the coming of the Holy Ghost, nevertheless in one place uses the expression " epiclesis of the holy and adorable Trinity."

In a sermon to the baptized, attributed to Athanasius, the consecration is said to be effected by " the great and wonderful prayers," and in the next section this is amplified: " when the great prayers and holy supplications have been sent up, the Logos comes down into the bread and the cup, and it becomes his Body " (*Patr. Gr.* xxvi., 1325). Whether this means that there was an epiclesis for the descent of the Logos is not so clear as might be; it could equally well denote the result, whether there were an invocation for the Second Person to

come, or for the Third Person to bring about the change whereby the bread becomes Christ's Body and the wine His Blood. In favour of the former interpretation might be adduced the definite Logos-epiclesis in Sarapion's liturgy; against it, the fact that Athanasius' successor, Peter, refers to the use of the latter in a rather emphatic way (Theodoret, iv., 19) soon after he became bishop of Alexandria, as does Theophilus a little later still (*ap.* St. Jerome Ep. 97).

In dealing with the witness of Ephrem Syrus it is safer to separate the Greek and Latin versions of his works from the Syriac; in two passages of the former a definite invocation for the descent of the Holy Ghost is mentioned; but since these have probably been edited by the translator (if they be not altogether spurious) their value is small. In the *Rhythms* the language is not so clear. "Lo! Fire and Spirit in the bosom of her that bare Thee! Lo! Fire and Spirit in that river wherein Thou wert baptized, Fire and Spirit in our Baptism! In the bread and the cup is Fire and the Holy Spirit" (*Upon the Faith*, Rh. x. 7). And again, speaking of Fire, in which "three names are seen," evidently here a type of the Trinity, he says: "A symbol of the Spirit is in it, yea, a type of the Holy Spirit, who is mingled in water that it may become a propitiation, and is blended with bread that it may become a sacrifice." At first sight it looks as though he meant either that the Holy Ghost was the content of the Eucharist, or else that "Holy Spirit" is to be taken as the divine nature of Christ. Sarapion, it will be remembered, also attributes the hallowing of the waters of Jordan to the only-begotten Word coming down upon them (edit. Wordsworth, S.P.C.K., p. 69). But in Rh. lix. 2 he makes it clear that he used an invocation of the Third Person at Baptism: "The Holy Spirit we called on at Baptism. The bold disputers have rejected the truth: they strive and say that it is not right to make Him equal with the Father and the Son." And again, of our Lord: "When Thou wert baptized, even Thou, the mystery of the Trinity baptized Thy humanity, the Father by His voice, and the Son by His Power, and the Spirit by His overshadowing" (Rh. li. 3). In Rh. x., *Upon the Faith*, Ephrem contradicts himself by his rapid changes of interpretation of his types. In § 3 he states: "In Thy bread is hidden the Spirit that cannot be eaten; in Thy wine there dwelleth the Fire that cannot be drunk"; but in § 5: "A new miracle it is that our mighty Lord giveth to bodily creatures Fire and the Spirit, as food and drink . . ." (then, speaking of Elijah's sacrifice): "Fire ate up the oblations, and we, O Lord, have eaten thy Fire in Thy oblation." Ephrem writes as though he held that the Second Person of the Holy Trinity was the agent of His

own Incarnation: "Blessed be He that dwelt in the womb, and wrought therein a perfect temple that He might dwell in it" (*On the Nativity*, Rh. ii.): "He in His own Person shaped an Image in the womb, and was shaping in all wombs all countenances" (*id.* Rh. iii.): "Sow Thy Voice in me, Thou that sowedst Thyself in the belly of Thy Mother" (*id.* Rh. x.); and again, "Fire went into the belly and clothed Himself with a body, and came forth" (*Upon the Faith*, Rh. iv. 1). *Fire*, therefore, is used, sometimes, by Ephrem as a symbol for our Lord's divine nature; as also in Rh. lxxi. 3, "The Fire that He [the Father] begat knoweth Him" (*cf.* Rh. xix. 1). And *the Spirit* is used by him, sometimes to denote the Third Person, usually with the qualification "holy"—*e.g.*, Rh. lix. 1, he mentions "the threefold names of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit"; and in the next section, "Say that the Holy Spirit hath not taken flesh." In referring to the Eucharist, therefore, "Fire and Spirit" may well be used for the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity respectively, and "mingling" and "blending" only expressions to denote the completeness of the operation of the Holy Ghost in effecting the coming of Christ in the elements. But Ephrem does not help to make things clearer by using types and imagery with so constant a shifting of meaning—*e.g.*, he can say, "In the Angels He [Christ] mingled Fire and the Spirit, that they might be of Fire and Spirit in a hidden manner," in the same Rhythm (*Upon the Faith*, x. 4) in which he applies these terms to illustrate the Divine action on the elements in the Eucharist.

According to St. Austin of Hippo, the Eucharist was consecrated "by the mystical prayer" (*de Trin.* III., iv. 10), which elsewhere is spoken of as "the orisons said when that which is on the Lord's Table is blessed and hallowed" (*Ep.* 149 *ad Paulin.* 16). In other passages the oblations are said to be "hallowed by the Word"; or, on "receiving the blessing of Christ, they become the Body of Christ" (*Ser.* 234). Again, "the bread on the altar, when hallowed by the Word of God, is the Body of Christ" (*Ser.* 227); "By the coming of the Word it becomes the Body and Blood of Christ. For take away the Word, it is bread and wine; add the Word and it is something else. . . . Take away the Word, it is bread and wine: add the Word and it becomes a Sacrament" (*Ser. ined.* vi.). One other thing is needed, "the cross of Christ. And unless that sign be applied to the foreheads of believers, or to the water itself of which they are reborn, or to the oil by which they are anointed with the Cream, or to the Sacrifice wherewith they are fed, not one of them is rightly accomplished" (*in Iohan. Ev.*, Tr. 118, § 5). It is the Word of God, the Second Divine Person, by

whose coming to the oblations in answer to the prayer they become the Body of Christ; what kind of epiclesis was contained in the prayer is uncertain, but "the sanctification is brought about by the Spirit of God working unseen" (*de Trin.*, III., iv. 10). There is some debate as to the meaning of the phrase "Spirit of God" here; some have denied that it can mean the Holy Ghost, yet it seems probable that the meaning is that the presence of the Word is effected by the Holy Ghost in the Eucharist as it was at the Incarnation. The phrase "Word of God" does not mean the words of distribution, for in St. Austin's view they have no consecratory effect: "For Christ was being borne in His own hands when He gave His Body, saying: This is My Body" (*Enarr. in* Ps. xxxiii. 10), and therefore the consecration had already taken place. So in another sermon: "He blessed the bread He had taken and said: *This is My Body*, etc. . . . Likewise He gave the chalice He had blessed, saying: *This is My Blood*," etc. (*Ser. ined.* iii.).

In other parts of Africa an invocation for the coming of the Holy Ghost is definitely known to have been in use. Optatus of Milevis (*c.* 380) asks what can be so sacrilegious as to break up, scrape, and carry away the altars of God "where God Almighty was invoked, where the Holy Ghost was prayed for, and descended" (*de Schism. Donat.* vi. 1). His picking out this feature of the liturgy shows that in his view, and in that of his opponents, it was a very important point, to say the least. Fulgentius of Ruspe, early in the sixth century, constantly mentions it—*e.g.*, he discusses "why, if to the whole Trinity the sacrifice be offered, only the sending of the Holy Ghost to hallow the gift of our offering is asked for"; and again, "the Holy Ghost is asked of the Father to consecrate the sacrifice" (*ad Monim.* ii. 6, 7).

Remembering the Donatist schism, it is natural to find the African Fathers laying particular stress on that aspect of the Eucharist connoted by the term "the Sacrament of Unity"; but, though for controversial purposes they insist on everything that can be used to emphasize that, it certainly does not follow that they ignored or rejected any other aspect. The probabilities, therefore, point to an invocation for the Holy Ghost being general in the African Church since the early part of the fourth century at the least; and suggest that it was on the same lines as that in the so-called Eg. C. O., which Dom Connolly has shown to be Hippolytus' *Tradition of the Apostles*. In this, which dates *c.* 225, in the Latin version, after the anamnesis and the oblation of the bread and chalice, the priest prays: "We beseech Thee to send Thy Holy Ghost on (*or* into) the oblation of holy Church; gathering them in one, to give to all

the saints who receive [it] for fulfilling of the Holy Ghost, for strengthening of the faith in truth," etc. In the Arabic and Ethiopic versions of the Statutes there is an addition in another chapter which implies that there was a specific prayer that the Holy Ghost might make the bread and wine the Body and Blood of the Christ, which is not found in the earlier Latin fragment. The " oblation of holy Church " can only be the bread and cup which have just been offered to God: in the Ethiopic it is " this oblation." There is no explicit petition for a change to be effected in the elements; although, given a belief that they become by the consecration Christ's Body and Blood, the prayer for the sending of the Holy Ghost on the oblation certainly implies it.

The witness of St. Cyril of Jerusalem is important for more than one reason. At the time when he delivered his Catechetical Lectures he was merely a priest, and so not at all likely to be instructing the newly baptized in novelties; in fact, he concludes his lecture on the Liturgy, which is the last of the series, with the words, " Hold fast *these traditions* unspotted, and keep yourselves free from offence." Hence it is only reasonable to assume that what he had been teaching he believed to be that which had been taught, so far as his knowledge went, for many years previously; that no new idea was introduced, and no novelty such as the introduction of an invocation for the Holy Ghost could be due to Cyril. The only point on which he enlarges in an explanatory or apologetic way is the value of praying for the departed in the Eucharistic Prayer; and that, obviously, in answer to some objector. Even here there is hardly a question of a new feature, though it may be that recently some change in the position of the intercessions had occurred; but the epiclesis on the Eucharistic elements was so far from a novelty that Cyril could use it to illustrate and enforce his teaching about that on the Cream for Confirmation (Cat. Lect. xxi., *Mystag.* iii. 3). It is, therefore, not legitimate to say that Cyril's epiclesis was a novelty in his days. In it there is a clearly expressed prayer that the Holy Ghost may be sent forth to make the bread and wine Christ's Body and Blood. There may be no parallel in any earlier writer to this; but what earlier writer set out to give a course of instruction on the Liturgy that has come down to us ? Hippolytus' *Tradition of the Apostles* is the only one, and that has an invocation that the Holy Ghost may come on the oblation, which implies that He might cause the elements to become Christ's Body and Blood. Nor is there much difference in shade of meaning between Cyril's phrase " that he may make " and *apophanein* of Apostolic Constitutions, or *anadeiknunai* of St. Basil's liturgy; both the latter

are used in classical Greek in the sense of "making" a man king, etc., and the latter of "making" a man to see (see quotations in Liddell and Scott). *Ta prokeimena* are not the gifts lying before *us*, but those that have been set forth on the altar and offered to God, lying before *Him*.

If an epiclesis for the Holy Ghost be considered impossible before the Macedonian controversy of the second half of the fourth century, at any rate, in the sense that it effects the change in the elements, because the functions of the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity were not sufficiently differentiated, it can only be so because before that controversy the Holy Ghost was not regarded as the specific agent of sanctification on earth, of both persons and things. Although it is true that there was a gradual clarification of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, it is easy to exaggerate what took place, for there was much looseness of terminology. Theophilus of Antioch calls the Logos "Spirit of God, and Arche, and Wisdom, and Power of the Highest" (ii. 10); but farther on he instances the first three days of creation as "types of the Trinity, of God and his Word and his Wisdom" (ii. 15). Clement of Alexandria calls the Spirit the energy (*iskhus*) of the Logos (*Paed.* ii. 2). Irenæus, writing of the creation of man, says, "The Son executing [the Father's commands] and creating, the Holy Ghost supplying nourishment and increase" (IV., xx., 6). That in Baptism and Confirmation the Holy Ghost sanctifies the recipient will be admitted; in blessing the baptismal water there is an instance in which the Third Person of the Trinity was regarded as the agent of sanctification of a thing. Tertullian can affirm that all waters "after the invocation of God obtain the sacramental power of hallowing; for the Spirit at once comes down from the heavens and rests on the waters, hallowing them from Himself" (*de Bapt.* iv.). Even Sarapion has an invocation of the Holy Ghost here as well as of the Logos (Wordsworth, 69). And in Confirmation the sanctification of persons is equally asked for. After unction with the Cream, says Tertullian, "the hand is laid on, calling to and inviting the Holy Ghost by the blessing" (*de Bapt.* viii.): and again, "the flesh is anointed that the soul may be consecrated, . . . the flesh is overshadowed by laying on of hands, that the soul may be illumined by the Spirit" (*de resurr. carnis*, viii.). That at an early period an invocation of the Holy Ghost was possible is clear also from the interesting variant in the Lord's Prayer pointed out by Chase (1891, pp. 25 *sq.*); a cursive MS. of St. Luke's Gospel has, instead of "let Thy kingdom come," "let Thy Holy Spirit come upon us and cleanse us." Tertullian, and apparently Marcion also, knew of this reading (*adv. Marcion.* iv. 26),

and so did Gregory of Nyssa (*de orat. domin.*) and Maximus Confessor.

To limit the connotations of the Greek word " epiclesis " to a prayer for the descent of the Holy Ghost on the elements, and to use the Latin equivalent " invocation " for other types wherein the prayer is for the blessing of the communicants and their offerings, does not seem to be very helpful, as ancient authors naturally make no such distinction; moreover, the elements are taken out of the offerings. The points that should be distinguished are three: (1) To Whom is the prayer directed ? (2) For Whose coming is it prayed ? (3) For what purpose is His intervention asked ? There are more different types of invocations than seems to be generally recognized. Among surviving forms at least eleven can be distinguished: (1) An epiclesis of the Father to send the Logos upon the oblations (Sarapion; Mâr Jacob of Serûgh; Ambrosian 2, one used as preface to *Pater noster ;* Mozarabic 2); (2) of the Father to send both the Logos and the Holy Ghost upon the oblations (Miss. Gall. 1 (*bis*), and as offert. in Sacr. Moysac); (3) of the Logos to come Himself upon the oblations, or to bless them (Moz. about 44; Miss. Goth. 1; Bobbio 2, as *Contest.* and *ad pacem*); (4) of the Logos to send the Holy Ghost on the offerings, and sometimes also on the communicants (Moz. about 6; *Lib. ordinum* 1); (5) of the Father, or of God, to bless or hallow the oblations (Moz. about 30; Miss. Goth. 2; Miss. Gall. 1; Miss. Franc. 1, as *super oblata ;* Bobbio 2, as *post nomina* and *contest.*); (6) of God (*Deus* or *Domine*), to accept the offerings, and generally also to give grace to the communicants (Moz. about 40; Bobbio 3; Miss. Goth. 2; Mone 1); (7) of the Holy Trinity to hallow, bless, or accept the offerings, or to send the Holy Ghost so to do (Moz. 5); (8) of the Father, or of God, to send the Holy Ghost upon the oblations to bless or to hallow them, and to benefit the communicants (Moz. about 20; Miss. Goth. 3; Miss. Gall. 1; Bobbio 3; Mone 2; *Lib. ordinum*, 5; Eg. C. O. = Hippolytus; Malabar; Offertory prayer in mass of M. F. Illyricus); (9) of the Father, or of God, to send the Holy Ghost to change the elements (Moz. 5; Miss. Goth. 5; Mone 2: Niebuhr's S. Gallen MS.; Statutes of the App. in Sahidic, Arabic, and Ethiopic versions; Leonianum 2, as offertory prayers; and nearly all later Oriental rites); (10) of the Holy Spirit Himself to come and hallow the oblations (Moz. 5; Gall. ordo, cited by Micrologus, for offertory prayer); and (11) of God to bless the offerings by the hand of His holy angel (Moz. 7; the anthem *Emitte Angelum tuum ;* offertory prayer *In nomine S. Trinitatis* of several medieval rites; and compare *Supplices* of Roman Canon).

The two invocations for the Logos, preserved in the Ambrosian rite, are early, and rather crude in language; probably earlier than St. Ambrose, who uses the fact that the coming of the Holy Ghost upon the oblations was asked for as an argument for the consubstantiality of the Third Person of the Holy Trinity with the Father and the Son (*de Sp. Sancto* iii. 16, 114): perhaps of the age of St. Zeno of Verona, who held that " Mary conceives of Him whom she brought forth " (*hom. in Nativ.*). It is probable that the Logos-epiclesis is an earlier type than the Pneuma-epiclesis; but with the growing realization of the work of the Holy Ghost, and of His personality, it gradually came to be held that He was the Instrument of the Incarnation, and of the parallel case of the Eucharistic Presence, of our Lord. In many parts this stage was reached long before the Pneumatomachian controversy.

The " holy angel " of many prayers is probably the Holy Ghost; but in others apparently a distinction is intended.

Another division must be made in Western forms and passages from authors; in most, perhaps, where a change is spoken of, it is that the bread and wine may be translated or transmuted into Christ's Body and Blood; but in some it is that Christ's Body and Blood may be " transformed " or " transfigured " in (*not* into) the bread and wine. Mr. Martin Rule (*J.T.S.*, April, 1911, pp. 413 *sq.*) contends that this phraseology is Roman and not Gallican, and traces it to St. Jerome and St. Leo; and it seems to go back to Tertullian's explanation of *transfigurare* (*adv. Prax.* 27).

The question of the date of the various forms of Western epiclesis mentioned above is difficult. Isidore of Seville writes as though the *post pridie* normally had an invocation of Cyril's type. Are, then, the prayers for the coming of the Logos relics of an earlier usage, or were they later changes due to a protest against Adoptianism in the eighth century? There is not adequate dated documentary evidence to decide the question as a whole; possibly both views may be correct, in that some may be very early and others of much later date. It should be remembered that the third Council of Carthage (A.D. 397) found it necessary to forbid prayers at the altar from being directed to other than the Father. This tendency may have existed elsewhere also.

CUTHBERT ATCHLEY.

THE CANON OF THE LITURGY

EFFORT will be needed during the next few years to get the essentials of Catholic order restored to our Consecration Prayer, that the question may not remain shelved, as it is at present. The essentials, not of validity but of good order, which were shorn off from its end in the Second Prayer-Book, in 1552, are a Remembrance or Anamnesis of our Lord's Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension; the Prayer of Oblation joined to the Consecration Prayer by this Anamnesis; and the Lord's Prayer linked on by some such prefatory formula as that in the First Prayer-Book, "As our Saviour Christ hath commanded and taught us, we are bold to say."

These changes have to do with the latter part of the Canon. A secondary yet important one concerns its beginning. This is the removal of the Prayer of Humble Access, in order that the Preface and *Sanctus* may be what they ought to be—an immediate prelude to the Consecration Prayer—and that the Access Prayer may be put back into its original place, where it is much needed as a devotion just before receiving the Sacrament.

In our present disappointment at the failure to get any of these things done in the forthcoming new Prayer-Book, it seems almost like some strange exciting dream that they all were not merely proposed but carried by large majorities in the Convocation of Canterbury three years ago; in the Upper House by the votes of nineteen diocesan Bishops to one, in the Lower by sixty-three clerical votes to twenty. But vetoed by a majority in the Upper House of York, the "Canterbury Canon," as it is sometimes popularly called, vanished again like a dream, leaving no trace among the varied proposals now agreed upon by Convocation for the new Prayer-Book. This is a signal failure to attain what the Archbishop of Canterbury set before the revisers, when he initiated their long task in 1906, with emphatic words on the necessity of being "abreast of modern needs and yet loyal to ancient order." The necessity of restoring the Canon is not unconnected with the Report of the Royal Commission on Discipline of 1904–6, which recommended revision of the Prayer-Book by Convocation in the interest of clearness of rules, elasticity, and reasonable comprehensiveness within the Church. The Report included severe censures on certain practices, and first and foremost on the use of the Roman Canon of the Mass by the priest at the altar, in conjunction with the Consecration Prayer. But really nothing more censurable lies behind most cases of this than the desire of many of the

clergy to commemorate in private devotion, since our public service no longer does so, the Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of our Lord, and the offering of the Eucharist to God, in accordance with "ancient order," after pronouncing the Words of Institution at the abrupt ending of our present Consecration Prayer. Certainly very many priests are, as it were, driven to do this, by the refusal to them of what they would greatly prefer—an authorized Canon essentially complete which they could say aloud with their people. In fact, they are apt to want too little rather than too much in the way of revision. One has sometimes to urge that the transfer of the Prayer of Oblation and Lord's Prayer to their old places is not enough, and that the restoration of an Anamnesis clause to the Prayer of Oblation is an equally necessary point in the re-establishment of the Canon.

For this there are both devotional and historical reasons. The Lord of the Eucharist is our risen and ascended Lord, who offers Himself to God for us and gives Himself sacramentally to us. Our present Consecration Prayer stops short with the Last Supper and the Cross. But in the other Anglican liturgies (the first Edwardian, Scottish, American, new South African), and in the historic Latin and Eastern ones, the Words of Institution are followed by an Anamnesis which lifts up the worshippers into the glory of the Resurrection and Ascension, and so into more completeness of Christian and Eucharistic truth. And from the most primitive age of which we have liturgical record it has been so. Recent research has solidly identified as the work of Hippolytus of Rome, early in the third century, a document in which the Canon of a liturgy is quoted. This may be accepted as substantially the primitive liturgy of the still Greek-speaking Church in Rome, long before the Latin Mass took its place. The Words of Institution are followed by an Anamnesis and an Oblation with Thanksgiving, in their most elementary form. "Remembering therefore his death and resurrection, we offer unto thee the bread and cup, giving thanks to thee that thou hast held us worthy to stand before thee and minister to thee."

There is much reason to think that all other liturgies, Eastern and Western, are ultimately derived from one parent form, near to the time of the Apostles, of which Hippolytus has here preserved the unique example. Its simple words of Anamnesis and Oblation are elaborated into the *Unde et memores* paragraph of the Roman Mass, in which a mention of the Ascension is added to that of the Passion and Resurrection, and "the bread and cup" are offered with much amplification of devotional language, although the thanksgiving

clause has dropped out and the rest of the Roman Canon is on different lines. In the Greek Liturgy of St. Chrysostom the Anamnesis is expanded to include other mysteries of our Lord, and with Greek preference for abstract language the phrase "this reasonable and unbloody sacrifice" takes the place of the concrete mention of bread and cup. In our own First Prayer-Book the essential clause of Anamnesis is "having in remembrance his blessed passion, mighty resurrection, and glorious ascension." But we have now lost this altogether, and our Eucharistic Oblation is severed from its rightful conjunction with the Consecration and deferred till after Communion, and even there it is only an optional alternative to another prayer.

This is why we ask to have the Anamnesis and the order of parts restored. The eleven words of Anamnesis cited just above can be inserted in the opening sentence of the Prayer of Oblation, without other alteration or addition to the Prayer except a "Wherefore" to link it to the Consecration Prayer. The offering of "the bread and cup" is covered, and more than covered, by our fine phrase, "this our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving," including as it does the idea of the primitive "giving thanks to thee" which the Roman Canon lacks at this point, though earlier, before the Consecration paragraph, it has a mention of "this sacrifice of praise."

After the restored Prayer of Oblation should follow the Lord's Prayer, introduced, as in both Eastern and Latin liturgies, with a prefatory formula. In this its traditional position the Lord's Prayer is at once the crown and summing up of the Canon of Consecration and a peculiarly appropriate preparation for Communion.

Another imperative reason for rejoining the Prayer of Oblation to the Consecration Prayer is that only by doing so can both it and the Thanksgiving, at present printed after it as a mere alternative, be fitted harmoniously into our order of service, so that both shall be said. Both are devotional and beautiful prayers, each contributes an element to our service which ought never to be lacking, and it is deplorable that one or the other must always be omitted, as at present. And it would be scant improvement to do what some propose, merely *permit* both to be said if desired, one after the other, as they stand. They are too long to be thus conjoined at this point in the service; it would overweight it here and spoil its balance of parts. Nor should it be even optional (much less obligatory, as at present) to omit either. Another reason against this is that the Thanksgiving ought to follow the reception of the Sacrament immediately; the intervention of anything else is a

drawback devotionally. Remove both the Lord's Prayer and Prayer of Oblation from this place, into which they were intruded in the Second Prayer-Book; reunite them to the Canon, at the same time inserting an Anamnesis clause in the Prayer of Oblation and a solemn prefatory sentence before the Lord's Prayer; move the Prayer of Humble Access as proposed: and you have not only the essentials of the primitive Canon restored and the fulness and balance of our service recovered, but you have also the admirable arrangement of the Communion with the Access Prayer before it and the Thanksgiving after it as immediate adjuncts, and then, to crown all, the *Gloria in excelsis*, whose transfer from the beginning to the end of the service was a happy change among a good many that were otherwise in 1552.

It seems strange indeed that the recovery of this complete and harmonious order should offend anyone or prove impossible of attainment in England. It is already in provisional use in the Church of South Africa, on the recommendation of the united episcopate of the Province. The Church in the United States of America, which already has the Anamnesis and Oblation at the end of the Consecration Prayer, is working towards the completion of the arrangement by proposals to move the Lord's Prayer thither also, and the Access Prayer from before the Consecration Prayer to before the Communion. The whole thing was done in the "Canterbury Canon" of 1918, as we have seen, and only defeated by a few adverse episcopal votes in the North. So long ago as 1637, it was the order chosen for the first Scottish Liturgy, by Bishops of that country in co-operation with Archbishop Laud in England. It will be noticed, of course, that it is only a partial return to the order of the First Prayer-Book of Edward VI., and also corresponds only partially to the arrangement of the present Scottish Office, which was extensively altered, and not for the better, in the eighteenth century. There is no proposal either in England, South Africa, or the United States to put the Prayer for the Church back into the Canon, either before the Consecration, as in our First Prayer-Book, or after the Consecration, as in the present Scottish order. Nor is it proposed to replace the Invitation "Ye that do truly," Confession, Absolution, and Comfortable Words before the Communion. At that point, in the Edwardian and Scottish rites, they form altogether too lengthy an intervention between the Consecration and Communion, tending rather to abate than increase the devotion of heart of the waiting Communicants. The Prayer of Access at this point is enough, yet not too much; and the Invitation and the rest are much better before the Canon begins, where

they prepare our hearts for the great moment of the Consecration as well as for the Communion to follow.

As for the position of the Prayer for the Church, its Scottish place after the Consecration has a certain devotional advantage and Eastern precedent, but adds greatly to the undesirable delay between the Consecration and Communion; and its place between *Sanctus* and Consecration in our First Book is much to be deprecated as a severing of these two parts, which ought to be most intimately connected. There is the same defect in the Roman Canon at this point, owing to the intervention of the inapposite *Te igitur* and Intercessions through some obscure ancient disarrangement. Roman Catholic scholars, who naturally are the chief investigators of the past of their own liturgy, conclude that the *Memento* of the Living, which now stands here, and perhaps that of the Dead, now after the Consecration, were originally a conjoint prayer for the living and the dead, at the Offertory, the most ancient position for what is called the "Great Intercession" of the historic liturgies, and the position of it in our present English order.

We learn from Hippolytus that then the Canon began with "The Lord be with you," and the *Sursum corda* dialogue, and a Preface which led up to the Consecration without the intervention even of the *Sanctus*, which had not yet been introduced into the liturgy. The Eastern rites have the *Sanctus*, but no incongruous interruption after it, like the Roman and ours. The tide of praise and thanks flows on unchecked in them, and this happy primitive feature is recovered and emphasized in the Scottish and new South African rites.

The liturgy in Hippolytus affords an example of the great antiquity in Christian worship of the mutual salutation "The Lord be with you," and its answer, which expresses the bond of charity between priest and people, and has a counterpart in the Old Testament, in the Book of Ruth (ii. 4). The *Dominus vobiscum* should be restored, not only before *Sursum corda*, as found in Hippolytus, but also at other traditional points in our service. The Convocation revision gives it back to us at only one place, before the Collect of the Day.

The Great War has not merely dispelled much prejudice against commemorating the Saints and praying for the Dead, but has spread abroad a truly Christian demand for more of this side of devotion in our services. We surely cannot long lag behind the South African liturgy in deleting the restrictive addition "militant here in earth" from the bidding of the Prayer for the Church, and substituting for the timid and unsatisfying last sentence of the prayer something more like the First Prayer-Book's memorial of Blessed Mary and the orders of

Saints and petition for our Faithful Departed. But here we are getting beyond our professed subject, the Canon.

Some readers will have noticed that nothing has been said yet even of the existence of another component of the Hippolytean Consecration Prayer, its Invocation of the Holy Ghost upon the oblation and communicants after the Anamnesis and Offering. The restoration of such an Invocation to our service was not included among the essentials of revision named earlier in this article, because its essential purpose is fulfilled by the petition "that we receiving these thy creatures of bread and wine . . . may be partakers of his most blessed Body and Blood." There is a similar prayer before the Consecration in the Roman Canon, and a similar absence of an Invocation of the Holy Ghost. If we can content ourselves, as well we may, with our inheritance of this Western tradition, it will be for our peace. The difference between this and the Invocation in the primitive Canon is immaterial. Quite otherwise is the Epiclesis or consecratory Invocation of the Eastern and Scottish liturgies. Its positiveness carries us beyond the primitive standpoint, and could not be introduced with happy results in the Church of England. Knowledge has advanced and broadened since Scotland, in the eighteenth century, conformed to what then seemed primitive. It is now seen to be a development specially characteristic of the Eastern liturgies, while Western ones have no uniformity about it. The petition in our Consecration Prayer agrees with the primitive Invocation in its preoccupation with the reception rather than the consecration of the sacrament. The mention of the Holy Spirit, which formed part of it in the First Prayer-Book, might advantageously be restored. But neither this nor any other change with regard to it is really vital, in view of the variations in the Catholic Church as a whole.

On the book attributed to Hippolytus see *The So-Called Egyptian Church Order* by R. H. Connolly, O.S.B., 1916. The Invocation therein is among the questions discussed in *L'Anaphore apostolique* by P. Cagin, O.S.B., 1919. Dr. J. A. Robinson, Dean of Wells, supports Cagin as to the Invocation, in *The Journal of Theological Studies*, January, 1920.

E. C. Trenholme, S.S.J.E.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We are glad that Professor Burkitt has issued in pamphlet form (Heffer and Sons, Cambridge, 1s. net) the paper on *Eucharist and Sacrifice* which he contributed to *The Interpreter* last April. Read in conjunction with the two liturgical articles which we publish this month, it will add fresh emphasis to the fact that eucharistic consecration is, and has been always and everywhere, essentially precatory, the action being consummated by divine energy in response to the prayers of the Church. This fact might well be taken as a starting-point for any effort which may be made to reach unity of doctrine among ourselves with regard to the Eucharist. There will always be those to whom the action of the Holy Spirit upon the hearts of the communicants is a truth more precious than His action upon the sacred elements; but the two truths are obviously not exclusive, but complementary, and both are needed if a just balance is to be preserved. Until some such understanding has been reached among us, we doubt whether liturgical revision will make any fruitful progress.

Oremus.

A Prayer of Erasmus.

(Freely translated).

O Thou Who art the Sun of Righteousness, evermore arising and never going down, flooding the world with life and gladness, shed upon us, we pray Thee, Thy glorious beams to scatter the night of sin, and the mists of ignorance and doubt, that we may walk purely as in the day, and joyfully in Thee, the one eternal light, Who livest . . .

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of Theology.

The Non-Jurors.

Sir,

I have been reading with very great interest the instructive, and indeed exciting, article of my friend Canon Ollard in your June number. Will you allow me two brief comments.

1. The Canon is mistaken in thinking that I have ever described "some Caroline High Churchmen as incurably Erastian."

2. The three MSS. of the Non-Jurors now in the Library of St. John's College, Oxford, have a special interest for that Society which owes a very great deal to Dr. Richard Rawlinson, whose heart it preserves in chapel ("ubi thesaurus, ibi cor"). It has charge of other of his MSS. and books, including an interesting letter-book which I should much like to see published.

Your obedient servant,

W. H. Hutton.

PAPERS FOR THE PRIESTHOOD

A.—DEVOTION

By Rev. W. B. Trevelyan, formerly Warden of Liddon House

II.—VOCAL PRAYERS

It is a difficult matter for a parish priest, especially if his parish is large or the work particularly strenuous, to secure regular or quiet times for prayer. That it should be so is wholly anomalous, and suggests that some revision of our methods is necessary. For the main work of a priest is spiritual; he should be to his people as Moses was to Aaron, "on the Godward side of life" (Exod. iv. 16, xviii. 19; Heb. v. 1). No one feels more keenly than a busy priest that "the world is too much with us," but the problem is, how to break loose from the hideous entanglement of the machinery, excellent no doubt in itself, which he may himself have created. Yet, without the necessary quiet, how can there be vision, or the "right judgment" for which we so often pray? Sir Reginald Blomfield, in his book *The Mistress Art* (pp. 75 ff.), takes Peruzzi as a type of the artist who stands aloof from worldly success. "You," he says to his brother architects, "are as artists to watch for and realize the finer and rarer qualities of life, to see the unobvious, to play the part of the interpreter to those who, from circumstances of life or character, would pass these matters by." How many of our failures or our futilities (often, it is true, unjustly exaggerated) might be saved if we were to apply this principle to our own work.

Our perilous and unbalanced activities, though they may win us a certain credit even from good people, are difficult to reconcile with our promise to be "diligent in prayer." Not that prayer is inconsistent with external activities—that is far from being the case. Never was there a life more full of activity than that of Him Who "went about doing good"; Who had "no time, not even so much as to eat." But that life was always rooted in prayer. "He was," St. Luke tells us, "in the deserts"; and the tense used implies that this practice was habitual with Him. He was constantly securing the quiet spaces without which even He could not safely lead a life of external activity. Dean Church, in *The Gifts of Civilization* (pp. 91 ff.), speaks of "the combination" in His life, "most intimate and never interrupted, of the work of time and human life with that which is beyond sight and time . . . He does what is most human, but He lives absolutely in the Divine." How, then, can we dare to think that we can do His work, or accomplish the Divine Will, if prayer means for us only "*prayers*" said at fixed intervals, rather than "*prayer*"—the deliberate and patient effort to learn to live habitually in the consciousness of God's presence? It is difficult to see how, without this, we are to attain that "poise" and tranquillity which make our work live, which make it a joy to ourselves and a help to others.

We may then consider briefly some practical points arising from what has been said.

1. The *daily offices* must be well and carefully said, not "got through" as a mere matter of duty. The scamping of offices is a real danger, as we know only too well. It is difficult to remember that they constitute a first claim upon our time, that they are, as St. Benedict says, the "opus

Dei." They must be said, when possible, in a reverent attitude; and, when circumstances permit, with our people. If these cannot or do not join us, we must obey the Prayer-Book, and anyhow say them in Church, even if quite alone. It is a great thing that our people should be reminded by the church bell that they are being prayed for. If we are "let or hindered by sickness or any other urgent cause," or if, *e.g.*, we are travelling, we shall still say them, and say them with what extreme reverence we can. Certain practices make, when they are publicly said, devout attention easier—*e.g.*, to go into choir when we are ready to do so, and not to let it be supposed that the clergy, or clergy and choir, must all go in together, and that at the last moment. Again, when plain-song is used, it is easy to sing an office in a quite edifying way, without any choir. Slovenly, inaudible, or careless reading should be avoided. Sitting, rather than standing, to recite the Psalms, makes the meditative use of them easier; and it should not be forgotten that they constitute the backbone of the offices.

2. *Daily Morning and Evening Prayers* are as necessary for us as for our people. To enter into details as to a matter on which we are so constantly trying to help others seems needless, if not actually impertinent. Yet there can be few of us to-day who are not conscious of the difficulty of doing well what so obviously must be done. Mr. Herbert Jeaffreson, in his *Divine Unity and Trinity*, says that in the early days of the Church this modern difficulty was not felt. One indication of this, he says, is that our modern multiplicity of little manuals of devotion was unknown, and that to Christians of the Apostolic or post-Apostolic Age it was easy to spend, *e.g.*, an hour in prayer.

3. *Ejaculatory prayer* will be increasingly used and valued. Suggestions will be gathered from our offices, and especially from the Psalms; from our meditation also, or from our reading.

William Law's advice is well worth remembering: "When at any time, either in reading the Scripture or any book of piety, you meet with a passage that more than ordinarily affects your mind, and seems, as it were, to give your heart a new motion towards God, you should try to turn it into the form of a petition, and then give it a place in your prayers, storing yourself with proper forms of making the desires of your heart known unto God" (*Serious Call*, chap. xiv.).

Readers of Mr. Gladstone's Letters will not forget how so busy a man as he, in the midst of his numberless activities, made his own manuscript collection of private prayers. Many of these are printed at the end of Mr. Lathbury's second volume.

These simple and obvious suggestions must be followed by some attempt, in further papers, to deal with more difficult aspects of prayer.

B.—IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

II.—WAYS AND MEANS.

The outstanding difficulty in the way of clerical study is inability to buy books, arising from their cost and clerical poverty. The thought that matters intensely to us is that of our own generation. The great nineteenth-century scholars were fighting nineteenth-century giants, and their battles seem but dim and far-off skirmishes to us in comparison with

the titanic combat waged by the Church to-day. This is an illusion, no doubt—the last generation felt just the same towards its predecessors—but it is a beneficent illusion, without which we might adopt a philosophic but un-Christian detachment towards the times in which we have to play our part. Some feel this difficulty acutely, and are tempted to lose heart, since the best thought of their time is a sealed book to them. Yet we must not exaggerate the loss. It may even be argued that modern books are the least necessary to the priest. From newspapers and magazines, by conversing with thoughtful people, he gains an instinctive knowledge of contemporary currents of thought. His duty is to dwell on the eternal truths which are the same in every generation until they are woven into his very nature. These can best be studied in the serene atmosphere of past ages, away from the dust and heat of to-day. Old books, and especially one old book, the Bible, are sufficient for the priest.

Such an argument deserves respectful consideration, even though it fail to carry conviction. It is well to be reminded how ephemeral nearly all modern books are, and how abiding the classics of theology. Fortunately we are not called upon to choose between old and new; of course we read both.

A man can be a good theologian and yet spend very little money on new books. He will manage to read a fair number in the course of a year, but will not deplete his purse and cumber his shelves by buying many. Let us consider sources from which books may be obtained.

The first necessity is to learn how to take notes, and to start some carefully arranged and indexed notebooks. A little experience will show what books lend themselves to analysis. To summarize a manual of doctrine would be indeed unprofitable. A far better course, if the book were worth it, would be to have it interleaved and add illustrative passages from one's reading. But most books can be analyzed with advantage. Condense the argument into a page or two, cull a few striking passages, and if you think desirable, add your own critical judgment. Be careful to put down the exact title, date, and publisher, then you can always procure the book later if necessary. Never omit to distinguish between your own summary and the actual words of the author by giving the latter in inverted commas, with the page reference added. In ten years' time you may find your old note-books useless for want of these elementary precautions.

Armed with his note-books the student will be emboldened to borrow books freely, confident of being able to return them within a reasonable time, their gist duly transferred to note-books. If we live near London the great libraries of Sion College and Dr. Williams will be our standby. For country dwellers Dr. Bray is available, and diocesan and archidiaconal libraries in many places only await a few keen spirits to be awakened to new life. Free libraries have sometimes far more in our line than we give them credit for, and books of the day can be had from the *Times*' Book Club and similar institutions with the help of well-to-do parishioners. But the shelves of our fellow clergy will probably provide us with as much as we can get through. Let us lend and borrow freely. Books are but tools. Their purpose is to be used, and it is far better that they should circulate freely in clerical studies, even at the risk of one here and there being lost, than that they should repose among the dust unread.

A word in conclusion about buying books. It is best to make a list of books we want to possess, and revise it from time to time; a chance

may come of getting some second-hand or by exchange. When at last we send the order, let us not be afraid of paying a fair price for what will be a lifelong possession. Most of us find that the big books are those really worth buying. The little ones can be borrowed, or we can guess their contents from reviews.

C.—PASTORAL WORK

By Rev. J. J. G. Stockley, Rector of Wolverhampton

II.—PREACHING

The Oxford Movement, like every other great adventure begun for influencing human beings, has suffered much from the mistakes of its exponents and supporters.

But no mistake has done more to weaken the force of the Movement and alienate possible converts to the Faith than the depreciation of the Sermon. It is, I am afraid, quite impossible to ignore or deny this. Until recently, it has, in certain circles, been considered one of the marks of "a good Catholic" to speak slightingly of preaching—in the hope (it was imagined) of thereby making the laity think more highly of the Sacraments. The result was, of course, to make clergy and laity alike think less seriously of all religion.

But the "making little of the Sermon," if it has been bad for the laity, has been almost ruinous for the clergy. It has enabled the clergy to slacken off from mental effort on the greatest of all subjects—their subject. It has given them abundant opportunities to fritter away their time on the less religious varieties of "social work." It has lowered the standard of the priesthood, and has cheapened Church life in every direction. And yet it is easy to see how the mistake came to be made. That "three-decker" pulpit in the very front of the "Table"—as we see the monstrous structure in faded eighteenth-century prints—had to be swept away. For the old Catholic religion meant emphatically the Sacrificial and Sacramental Worship of God in all the beauty of holiness, and it therefore meant pulling down the stuffy Hanoverian preaching-box and the abolition of the comfortable (but sometimes learned!) bewigged and begowned "Minister" who occupied it.

So "they set the Altar upon his bases" (Ezra iii. 3). With all our hearts we thank God for it! That which was positively done was right and good. Where we venture to say the great mistake was made—and it was *not* made by the first leaders of the Oxford Movement—was when a practical denial was given to the truth that men were ordained to the priesthood, not only to be the Stewards of the Mysteries of God, but also to be preachers of salvation from sin, and expounders of the Divine Wisdom of Him Who is the Light of the World.

We know now how dire the mistake was, and, although the harm done cannot, unhappily, be undone, it is our business to correct what is wrong as thoroughly as we can and as soon as possible.

After all, everyone recognizes that a new era of consciousness, vision, and life is opening for the Church in England. The National Assembly and the Parish Church Councils—the Anglo-Catholic Congress and the Priests' Convention—the ever-growing interest in the Mission Work of

the Church at home and overseas—these are signs of unmistakable vitality and vigour. There are, indeed, complaints that the churches are emptying, and that the Church as a witness for national righteousness may be deemed negligible. But these complaints are only partly justified.

One thing, certainly, is abundantly clear. Wherever there is a preacher who, without necessarily being eloquent, is respected for his sincerity, takes trouble, preaches the truth from his heart, but (as Lord Morley says) lets that truth "go round by his head," people will come and listen, and many of them will be convinced and place themselves within the circle of active membership in the Body of Christ.

The encouraging fact remains—there is still a tremendous opportunity for the man who wishes to be a preacher. Could anything be a greater encouragement to us and especially to the younger priests, beginning their Sacred Ministry? The newly-ordained have often to listen to the ecclesiastical Cassandras of the day telling them how gloomy is the outlook. Well, here is something on the other side that outweighs all. Here is a fact which everyone can prove the truth of, if he wishes. It *is* true that, although "there are many adversaries," "a great door and effectual is opened" unto us (1 Cor. xvi. 9).

How shall we fit ourselves for the work? First, by reminding ourselves what preaching is. Phillips Brook's definition is as near the mark as possible. "Preaching," he writes, "is the communication of truth by man to men. It has two essential elements, truth and personality. . . . The truth must really come through the person, not merely over his lips, not merely into his understanding and out through his pen."

We shall obey St. Paul when he advises Timothy "to take heed unto thyself and unto thy preaching"—and consider personality first.

It is God's Will to save mankind through Jesus Christ the Incarnate Word. The Catholic Church, the Body of Christ, carries on this work of salvation by the power of the Spirit. The Church is, we believe, a society, but it is not a mechanical contrivance. Human beings, the members of the Church, are not mere related units of a mechanism, formed to produce certain results. No. The Church is a Divine, human, living society of consecrated personalities, all bearing some likeness to the Head, but all different from one another, and all manifesting the rich diversity of the One Life of God.

In a particular sense the preachers of the Good News must be consecrated personalities and not merely good persons. (Of course, we are bitterly conscious of not even being "good persons" without the realized Grace of Orders helping.)

In detail, we are behind our preaching in this sense.

(i.) The whole personality of the man must be at the back of the sermon, and the preacher himself must be converted and devout if he is to convert others and make them devout. The words of Cardinal Newman are very appropriate here: "Sanctity," he says, "has its influence, intellect has its influence; the influence of sanctity is greater in the long run; the influence of intellect is greater at the moment." And so the preacher must learn to pray—a lifelong and most arduous task. He must, as St. Ignatius Loyola says, "pray as if everything depended on prayer, and act as if everything depended on action." This is the deepest, the essential preparation of the personality.

(ii.) And the preacher's mind must be instructed, trained, and always

open. I am not going to attempt even a short sketch of our inadequate intellectual training. It is surely better to make the best of things with regard to ourselves who have been ordained. But it is no less a manifest duty to press for a thorough change and improvement as regards those to be ordained in the future. We know quite well that St. Francis de Sales was right in his statement—"The knowledge of the priest is the eighth Sacrament of the Church"; and we know, too, that in recent years the Church of England has not believed him. A good deal, surely, can at once be done by all of us, young, middle-aged, and old. Every priest can, if he wishes, get together some sort of library, however small. If, in the selection of books gradually acquired, he will take advice from some learned and sensible friend, his library will be of the utmost value to him. And, further, he can borrow very likely, from that most useful institution, a Bray Library, and, certainly, from a free library if he is in or near a large town. (More and more, by the way, are free libraries becoming a great help to the clergy.) So there is little doubt that every priest who wishes to read seriously can do so.

But *will* he read? He solemnly promised this at Ordination. The Bishop then said to each of us: "Will you be diligent in prayers, and in reading of the Holy Scriptures, and in such studies as help to the knowledge of the same, laying aside the study of the world and the flesh?" And we answered, "I will endeavour myself so to do, the Lord being my helper."

Yes, the Sacred Scriptures first. But it is unnecessary to interpret this answer as shutting out the study of literature not directly connected with religion. If our aim is clear—the glory of God and His service in the ministry of preaching—we had better read widely not only the book of human life, but the best books of every kind new and old.

"Personality and Truth"—the two elements in preaching! The shaping of the personality by the Holy Spirit, with the human will co-operating—this is the real preparation for every sermon we preach. As to the immediate preparation, men will be right in adopting their own plan—as long as there *is* immediate preparation, whether of written sermons or extempore ones. Have a definite subject, and a good text can always be found. Have a clear aim, and don't worry too much about the method. Let us not say to ourselves, "What can *I* make of this sermon?" but, "What does God want me to do for His people by means of this sermon?"

And, lastly, we will always remember that Christ has sent us on a Mission to teach the world His Truth. That Truth includes the Gospel of Salvation to sinful men; the gradual unfolding of the Faith ever old and ever new; and the careful systematic instruction in the Sacramental system of the Catholic Church. This Truth is meant for each child, each man, each woman, living his or her intensely individual life. The Truth is meant for all as Members of the Divine Society of Jesus. The Truth is meant for us as social beings bound, if we are indeed Christ's followers, to consider the interests of others—in the group, in the nation, in the world. And the Truth is, in the supreme sense, meant for us as

"Sons of immortal seed, high destined men,"

who have, above "the things seen and temporal," to set ever "the things unseen and eternal."

The Divine Master bids us preach His Gospel. And when we think

seriously what even a little part of this means, we can only cry out with God's prophet:

"Then said I, Ah, Lord God, behold I cannot speak: for I am a child. But the Lord said unto me, Say not, I am a child: for thou shalt go to all that I shall send thee, and whatsoever I command thee thou shalt speak. Be not afraid of their faces: for I am with thee to deliver thee, saith the Lord. Then the Lord put forth His hand and touched my mouth. And the Lord said unto me, Behold, I have put My words in thy mouth" (Jer. i. 6-9).

D.—CIVIC RELATIONS OF THE MINISTRY

By Miss A. M. Deane, O.B.E., Ministry of Labour.

I.—UNEMPLOYMENT AND EXISTING EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES.

The problem of unemployment is a vital National question to-day. It comes home to us personally when we are faced with men and women seeking work who ask us to help them, and we find it difficult to know what to do.

Only those who have faced the menace of "no work," and whose life depends on labour for daily bread, can understand the awfulness of the hydra-headed monster "Unemployment."

If at the moment it looks as if there was not enough work to go round, and we have the unemployed clamouring at the door, we must try and help, and we shall do this best by thoroughly understanding existing Employment Agencies, how we can use them, how they work, and what they can and cannot do, always remembering that an Employment Agency cannot possibly make work that does not exist.

Let us take the State Employment Agency first—the Employment Exchanges. What are they doing for men, women, and children, and how can they be made the best use of?

The great thing to remember in this connection is that the system is National, that they are open and free, and that they deal with all classes of applicants for work and with all classes of work, and that if they do not at present do all that they should it is up to us to see that they become more and more efficient, for without doubt their conception is right and they have proved infinitely more successful than any other Employment Agency working in any other country.

Those who have to deal with the problem of Unemployment will realize that the following points are essential if we are even in a measure to solve it:

1. The necessity for the Central Registration of unemployed persons.
2. The need for some centre where the notification of the demand for labour is possible.
3. A National Clearing House for all Labour, whether organized or not.
4. Some central means of giving information to those in need of it as to opportunities for work and the nature of the work in different parts of the country.
5. The need for District Officers to deal with the payment of Unemployment Insurance and the necessity of safeguarding this

Fund in the National interest by offering available employment whenever possible instead of Benefit.

6. The need for co-ordinating the interests of employers and workers in preventing unemployment and dealing with the problem locally as well as Nationally.

It would seem that the Employment Exchanges have been established to carry out the above functions, and in so far as they are doing so they are meeting a National need.

Having arrived at this point, we need practical knowledge of the way in which this National Employment Agency works. There is an Exchange in every principal town in the United Kingdom, and in addition there are small local branches in country districts which are linked to a parent Exchange, so that no man or woman is supposed to have to go more than five miles to register for Employment or to obtain their Unemployment Insurance if they are insured persons. Each office is linked by telephone with its parent Exchange, and all Exchanges are grouped in what are called " Labour Clearing areas," so that Labour Control becomes a real thing, and the local demand and supply, the area demand and the National demand and supply of labour in any particular occupation or trade can be known in a few hours. The whole Labour Control of the United Kingdom is " cleared " every twenty-four hours, and a National Clearing House Newspaper is published daily for the use of all Employment Exchanges, giving the available openings for work, and cancelling the openings previously published which have been filled.

An employed worker can hear of work in any part of the country and can be helped to get to work, and if the Exchange sends a man or a woman to work away they can if necessary have a railway ticket issued to them, the cost of which is refunded later, either by the worker who undertakes to do this, or in most cases by the prospective employer.

There is now a special department dealing with ex-sailors and soldiers in each Exchange. There is a special Domestic Service Section for women and girls, and there is a department dealing with the Overseas Settlement of men and women in co-operation with a Committee of the Colonial Office.

Unemployed women and girls are helped with training through the Employment Exchanges, and there is now a Professional Women's Register which works in co-operation with the Federation of University Women.

In view of the fact that Unemployment Insurance has been extended to all classes of workers, with the exception of agricultural workers and private domestic servants, the scope of the employment side of the work has been greatly extended, and an effort has been made to have different sections in all Exchanges with people in charge of them who are qualified to advise and help the special type of worker, whether professional, clerical, or industrial.

There are, of course, other Employment Agencies at work.

A certain amount of placing of special cases in work will always be done by Guilds of Help and Civic Leagues and Charity Organizations, but these are for the most part to-day working in close co-operation with their Local Employment Exchanges.

The Trade Unions will always deal with the skilled openings in their special industries, but here again it will be found that their Vacant Books are as often as not kept at the Exchanges, and any transfer of labour

from one part of the country to another is invariably done in co-operation with them.

There will always be certain specialized Employment Registries such as those that exist for Domestic Servants, and there is the Skilled Bureau for Women which is admirably run by Miss Spencer in London, and which has branches in different places run in co-operation with the National Council of Women.

When an unemployed man or woman comes to us for work, we should make use as far as possible of existing machinery, always remembering that an Employment Agency cannot *create* work; but in normal times a *bona fide* worker will get the best opportunity of work where a choice of employment can be offered. It is not sound as a rule to get jobs for people by personal favour. Indeed, if we are ever to get the Unemployment question solved and justice done to the workers, we must set our face against the favouritism and preferential treatment that still exists and that love of "patronage" which is inborn in so many people.

Let us begin with young workers. The right choice of employment matters so to them. See to it that training is more and more possible. The Industrial and Commercial prosperity of the country depends on efficiency, and it is important, when work is offering, that as far as possible the most capable workers should get it.

DISCUSSIONS

Notes upon the Document of Reunion proposed at Montreal "between the Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Church of England in Canada" as published in THEOLOGY, of July, 1921.

BY DR. GORE.

I have been asked to write a note upon this document, which I shall presume to be in the hands of my readers, as it was printed at length in the last number of THEOLOGY. My space is very restricted, and I will proceed accordingly to the task assigned to me without endeavouring to express my deep regret that I cannot take a more favourable view of the document.

I cannot but regret that the Lambeth Conference did not on certain points speak more explicitly: but I think it was made fairly clear that what they contemplated was that Ministers of denominations other than those properly episcopal should, before being admitted to fellowship in our ministry, receive Episcopal ordination duly and properly, though the ordination would be conditional. (1) I think the greatest consideration possible should be given to the conscience or feelings of those who have been called to, and who have exercised, the ministry in the various non-Episcopal societies: and I think the idea of ordination *sub conditione* is not unacceptable from a Catholic point of view. No Catholic-minded person is required to affirm that any spiritual calling or gift cannot be given by God except through its normal sacramental channel. The men we are considering profoundly and unhesitatingly believe that they have received in its full reality the spiritual gift qualifying them for the ministry of the Word and Sacraments instituted by Christ for the

salvation of souls. We are under no necessity, nor have we the right, to meet this conviction with a negative. (2) What we are in a position to say, and are bound to say, is that in the judgment of the Catholic Church they have not been qualified for ministry in the only manner recognized by the Church—that is, by Episcopal ordination; and that before they are admitted to officiate as priests or ministers of the word they must be ordained in the Catholic manner. Both these requirements (1) and (2) are met by conditional ordination.

On the other hand, the non-Episcopalians have no hesitation in accepting the validity of our ordinations, and all that they desire to give to us is commission to exercise our recognized ministry in their churches. No doubt *that* presents a difficulty from our point of view. Commission is a question of jurisdiction, and to agree to receive commission is to acknowledge jurisdiction. This difficulty is not, perhaps, insuperable, and I am not going to dwell upon it. For the moment let it be granted that our clergy should consent to receive commission to minister in Presbyterian and other non-Episcopal congregations as an act of reciprocity and as part of a scheme of (partial) reunion between religious societies at present separated in virtue of which on their side their ministers are to receive Episcopal ordination *sub conditione*. So I understood the Lambeth scheme.

But—and this is the chief point—the Montreal scheme can only be read as providing for commission on both sides, and not for ordination properly so called by the Bishop on ours. So it is expressly said in the proposed Preface—"Presbyterial Commission" to be received by our clergy and "Episcopal Commission" on the other. And, later, "a commission to the office of priesthood" is spoken of as to be given on our part, and in the prayer which follows it is made, I think, manifest that what is contemplated is not the conferring of ministry, but the extension of the sphere of its exercise—*i.e.*, it is not ordination proper, which is the initial conferring of the grace of order and ministry by the sacramental act of the laying on of hands. So the formula is not "Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest here committed unto thee," etc., but only the bestowal of authority: "Take thou authority to execute the office now committed to thee by the imposition of our hands."

I cannot profess to be satisfied with the Lambeth scheme. It seems to me to tremble on the verge of violating the inviolable and admitting the inadmissible. Nevertheless, it does not go over the edge. It admits of an application which Catholic-minded people could accept. But this Montreal proposal does go over the edge. I cannot at present imagine that the proposed Commission to Presbyterian ministers could be accepted from the Catholic point of view as valid ordination, or that anyone who holds the Catholic belief about orders could accept the sacraments ministered under this Commission.

In saying this I know I am saying that the acceptance of this proposal as it stands by the Anglican authorities in Canada (and, of course, the Anglican authorities in the Montreal diocese cannot be suspected of proposing to act without their brethren of the rest of the Anglican communion in Canada) would involve the Catholic-minded portion of the Canadian Church in a very difficult position; and if the arrangement were approved in other portions of the Anglican communion, it would sow the seeds of separation very openly and certainly. It seems to me,

therefore, necessary to raise a very serious note of warning. The admission of this proposed Episcopal form of commission as being valid ordination would necessitate the abandonment of a great part of the ground on which we have stood in our defence of our Anglican ordinations. And such abandonment we must altogether decline.

There are other points on which note or comment is necessary. Thus, the form proposed for these Episcopal commissions for priesthood (1) does not appear to be part of the Eucharistic service; (2) omits all the elements of our ordinal which secure the preparation of the mind of the ordinand for the reception of the great gift and the solemn contracting on his part to fulfil the obligations of his ministry in respect of faith or discipline and conduct; (3) alters the form of ordination, not only as already noticed, but also by the omission of the words "whose sins thou dost forgive," etc. In our existing ordinal, it should be noticed that the ordination to priesthood is markedly separated from the authority to minister in a particular area. The newly-proposed form confuses the two.

It must also be noted (4) that no provision is made for the previous confirmation of those to be ordained: nor (5) for their previous admission to the diaconate. Ordination *per saltum* is taken for granted not only as valid but as desirable.

On these points, however, I have not space to dwell at the moment. Nor do I know what chance there is of these proposals being acceptable to the Presbyterians or to the Montreal synod, or to the other dioceses in Canada. But whatever future awaits it, I think nothing but gain can result from indicating what seems to be, from the point of view of the Catholic conception of Holy Orders, the character of the proposals.

CHARLES GORE.

BY REV. J. A. DOUGLAS.

The Archbishop of Canterbury pointed out recently to the General Assembly of the Scottish Kirk that in plans for Reunion the Church of England must remember the existence of Constantinople. It may be well, therefore, to consider whether these Canadian proposals would prejudice the close relations which now exist between the Anglican Churches and the Eastern-Orthodox.

To that end it must be remembered that:

(1) The Eastern-Orthodox have always maintained, as they maintained last year at Geneva with great energy and precision, that Union can be effected only on the basis of full dogmatic Union, which it is patent is still distant between us and them.*

(2) That their only possible preliminary to dogmatic agreement is the acceptance of the Faith of the first nine centuries—*i.e.*, of the Œcumenical Councils—as its basis.*

(3) That while they maintain that they have retained that Faith without addition or subtraction, they are prepared for investigation, and, if necessary, will correct themselves.

It follows, therefore, that they would be unable to enter into dogmatic Union with these Canadian non-Episcopalians. And further, since they

* See my *The Relations of the Anglican Churches with the Eastern-Orthodox*, Faith Press, 1921, chapter i.: also Dr. Leighton Pullaw in *The Christian East*, July, 1921.

could not unite with a Church which was in Union with an heretical Church, it follows that strictly the formal Intercommunion of an Anglican Church with bodies that retained Protestant characteristics would prejudice our ultimate Union with them.

The Eastern-Orthodox, however, have never abandoned the exercise of that *Economy* or "prudent stewardship" by which, as their theologians maintain, the Church has power to mitigate "the strictness of the law."

It is thus that, while they do not admit the validity *per se* of any Sacrament whatever outside the One True Church (*i.e.*, their own Communion) and are not prepared to recognize Roman, Armenian, or Anglican Baptism and Orders as principles, they hold themselves able, and are ready, to recognize them by *Economy*.

In regard to Anglican Orders, Eastern-Orthodox theologians, as is well known, have been engaged in their investigation for many years, their view, since Professor Androutsos published his celebrated monograph in 1904, having tended to be increasingly favourable.

It is thus that Professor Comnenos, who, on account of his scholarship and caution is possessed of considerable authority, has this year published a brochure* in which he maintains that:

(1) The Anglican rite is sufficient, the Anglican Apostolic Succession certain, and the Anglican doctrine of the Ministry adequate (*i.e.*, that the priestly power to offer the Eucharistic Sacrifice and to absolve is both intended to be given and given).

(2) Accordingly, the Anglican Ministry should be recognized *economically*, all Anglican Sacraments accepted, and Intercommunion allowed in emergency.

Now it should be noted that he arrives at these conclusions in spite of the fact that he is well aware—he was present at the Lambeth Conference—of the different schools of thought which exist among ourselves.

Applying these considerations to the Canadian proposals, it is reasonable to think:

(1) That the Eastern Orthodox would regard the method by which these non-Episcopalian bodies were brought into Communion with the Anglican Church in Canada as to be regulated by economy, and that that regulation is our own concern, but

(2) That care must be taken (*a*) that the Faith of the Anglican Churches in no way be compromised, and (*b*) that if the Ministers of these non-Episcopalian bodies are to be accepted as priests by the Anglican Communion they should receive the full power and authority of the priesthood in canonical manner.

Accordingly, a careful scrutiny of the service of recognition proposed would seem to show that, if some form, such as is prescribed for use in our ordinal by the Bishop when laying hands on a priest were inserted to show that power to absolve, etc., was given, the situation as between the Anglican Churches and the Eastern-Orthodox would not be prejudiced.

J. A. Douglas.

* Συμβολαὶ εἰς τὰς Προσπαθείας πρὸς Ἕνωσιν. Τεύχος, Α. Γεράρδος, Κων/πόλει, 1921.

REVIEWS

A Short History of Russia. By A. R. Ephimenko, Professor in the Higher Academy for Women at Petrograd, 1912. Translated by Herbert Moore, M.A., with Maps and Illustrations. S.P.C.K. 1920. Pp. 158. Price 6s. 6d.

Ephimenko's *Short History of Russia* is a work of general rather than religious interest; it fills a distinct gap in modern literature, for with the exception of Mr. Norfitt's History, published in 1902, we cannot think of any popular history of Russia. Wallace's *Russia*, in two large volumes, immensely valuable though it is, is planned on totally different lines and is not intended, as Professor Ephimenko's, for the junior classes of public and elementary schools. It is no small feat to have comprised the whole of Russian history into a little over 150 pages. No event of any importance has been omitted, and the evolution of the vast and imposing edifice of the Russian Empire from the Principality of Kieff is traced with great lucidity and with a grasp of the essential forces at work which only a Russian could exhibit. For Russia is a country of surprising contrasts and conflicting tendencies, which make her study the despair of Western Europeans. The juxtaposition of palaces and hovels in her great cities, fastidious luxury elbowing sordid poverty, the combination in the individual Russian of kindness and cruelty, refinement and savagery, religion and immorality—these are the outward tokens of these contrasts and conflicts which we see throughout Russian history; and, unless we appreciate them, we shall never be able to understand the tremendous events which are taking place in Russia to-day.

We have pointed out that this is a secular history of Russia, not a history of the Church. But no history of Russia can escape being ecclesiastical. Since that far-off day, in 988, when Vladimir and his people at Kieff were baptized in the River Dnieper, the Faith has been united with the race in such a bond as hitherto to defy resolution. Whilst her Faith has inspired all national progress, we may indeed say all national movements of every kind, the fabric of her Church has kept Russia together at times when her temporal government was in ruins or her territory under pagan rule. As Professor Ephimenko says, "With the new faith came a new life. The people themselves began to be changed." For nearly 1,000 years down to, and including, 1914 every war has been for "Russia and Orthodoxy." When Alexander Nevski met the Germans at

Pskoff in 1241, and lifting his hands to heaven cried, "Judge Thou my cause, O Lord, with this arrogant people," it was for the "Orthodox," or Eastern, as against the "Catholic," or Western, faith that he fought; and with the same appeal to Heaven, and bearing the same sacred icons, the late Tsar went forth to meet the Germans again in the Great War. The Serbians, the cause of the quarrel, were brothers in race, but, far beyond this in the mind of the Russians, they were brothers in the Faith. When we realize that throughout the centuries every war in which Russia has been engaged has been either a crusade, or at least had to be represented to the people as a crusade, we shall begin to understand the stream of Russian history. Mr. Moore has an admirable note on this subject on page 29. The author brings us down to the accession of the Emperor Alexander III.; in an Appendix the translator continues the history to the great catastrophe. After describing the outbreak of the War and the Revolution of 1917, he concludes: "The Russian army melted away, with the Germans still on Russian soil; the soldiers killed their officers and returned to their homes, hoping to seize the land. But this was not enough. In the name of freedom the prisons were opened, and all the laws protecting life, property, and morality were overthrown. The Bolsheviks gained the upper hand. The Emperor was killed." We are in the immediate presence of a cataclysm so profound, of a catastrophe so immense, that our minds have been numbed to insensibility. The French Revolution was a tremor compared with the Russian earthquake—in every particular, from the murder of the Royal Family downwards, it has been eclipsed. Nothing like it has occurred since the Fall of the Roman Empire, and that was the work of long centuries, so that men hardly recognized that the old order was passing away. What are we to think of the Russian Revolution, and what will be the end? Here, again, Professor Ephimenko's book will guide us. Like all conflicts in Russia, the Revolution is a conflict of religion; it is an issue joined between Paganism and Judaism, combined in proportion not easily to be estimated, against Christianity. It is an attempt of unparalleled ferocity to overthrow the Christian religion, and with it the entire Christian morality; all other manifestations which attract the attention of Western onlookers (who, because they are Western, have long been accustomed to think in compartments) are subsidiary. And all the information we get from Russia shows that the attempt has already failed, and victory has been registered in heaven. Suddenly deprived of the temporal partner on which she had leaned from her birth and consequently able to meet the storm in her disorganized

condition, plundered, persecuted, proscribed, the Church is the one institution in Russia which the Bolsheviks have failed to subvert, and before which they have been forced to recoil. Whatever government the future may have in store for Russia (and that it will be largely a personal government, as in the past, seems probable, though the old Empire and the Romanoff dynasty have seemingly passed away beyond recall), it is her Church which has once again saved the country and the people, and it is on the foundation of her Faith that the new edifice will arise. Amidst much that for the moment must be mere conjecture, this at least seems clear.

The translator has done his work well, and it is high praise that his English does not read like a translation. We notice one transliteration to which exception might be taken, on page 107. Is the Polish "pan" exactly represented by the Russian "Knyaz"? We should prefer to translate "pan" by the English word "landlord."

ATHELSTAN RILEY.

LAW'S SERIOUS CALL. Edited and abridged by R. Gordon Milburn. (Manuals of the Inner Life.) S.P.C.K. Pp. xi + 231. Price 4s. 6d. net.

It is a happy thought to form a daily lectionary out of Law's *Serious Call;* and the task which Mr. R. Gordon Milburn has set himself has been exceedingly well performed. Not the least good result of his labours should be that many will be introduced through this abridgment alike to the reading of the complete book, as also to the other works of Law.

The eighteenth century in English church history well repays study. It was a period of lethargy for reasons which can easily be discovered. It was marked by personalities greater perhaps than the Church of England has produced at any other period. It is peculiarly instructive for modern Churchmen because in it, unlike the Middle Ages or the Tudor period, the fundamental ideas are the same as those that rule to-day. The eighteenth century cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of the life of Law.

In reading the eighteenth-century history of the Church it is well to remember that most tendencies can be traced back ultimately to the events of 1687, 1688, and 1689—the Declarations of Indulgence and the Glorious Revolution. At the Revolution the Church of England, as the successful opponent of Popish attacks upon English liberties, appeared to have a unique opportunity for reabsorbing a large proportion of the Dissenters, and for assuming leadership among foreign Protestants. It was an age when the Spirit of the Lord undoubtedly

touched the imagination of men like Stillingfleet and Burnet, who saw visions of a national Church, embracing all except fanatics, taking a lead among the peoples of the North. Having advised Dissenters against taking their liberties in the unconstitutional form offered by the Restoration monarchy, they were ready to go forward to meet them in a series of so-called "comprehension" movements. These movements are not easily explained if one does not allow for the influence both of the reaction from Puritanism, as also of the philosophy of Locke, the intellectual giant of the period. Men were weary of the Puritan idea that the Bible laid down a definite scheme of government for Church and State. Moderate men, at the close of the seventeenth century, held that on all questions where no definite rule was laid down in Scripture, each Christian was free to be guided by his own estimate of expediency. Here they displayed the influence of Locke, in whose view the whole sphere of obedience to government was a sphere in which expediency should rule.

Now a great debt is owed the Non-Jurors for pointing out the dangers of this view, but unprejudiced reading of the period shows the disastrous nature of the schism. In the first place, by considering that it was necessary to preserve the points of view by the consecration of separate non-juring bishops (the line ended with the death of Bishop Gordon in 1779), they fell into the mistake which the leaders of the Oxford Movement avoided, and lost their influence within the Church. They laid themselves open to the charge of pedantry, for they differed hopelessly among themselves as to what they were, or were not, prepared to swear, and thus, in the eyes of the public, discredited the religious conscience. Lastly, by implication they ruined the influence of the *jurors* in the outside world by the suggestion that conformity was nothing but a form of time-serving.

Thus the age which opened so hopefully degenerated into a period in which historians have to look carefully to find evidence for religious vitality. The parties in the Church had reached a deadlock. It is the supreme contribution of Law that he started, or at least promoted, an influence which in time was to dissolve this deadlock. His controversy with Hoadly is an example of dialectics used in a great cause which deserves to rank with, say, the Lincoln-Douglas debates on slavery. Yet perhaps it was not the non-juror so much as the scholar of Emmanuel, the disciple of the Cambridge Platonists, the constructive critic of Locke's philosophy, the student of the German and French mystics, the inspirer of future generations to the day of Keble and Maurice, that gives to Law his pre-eminence in an age of giants. There is the well-known story

of the thoughtless guest who, in John Keble's presence, called the *Serious Call* a "clever book." Keble said nothing at the moment; but, when the guest left, he drew him aside and confessed that the phrase had deeply wounded—"it was as if you had said that the Day of Judgment would be a pretty sight!"

GEOFFREY BUTLER.

NOTICES

BISHOP MOORHOUSE OF MELBOURNE AND MANCHESTER. By Edith C. Richards. John Murray. 1920. Pp. xi+266. 14s. net.

There is perhaps no stronger reason for believing in the providence of God than that which may be derived from noting how, when a crisis occurs, men of extraordinary powers are raised up to meet it. Bishop Moorhouse was one of these. His gifts of intellect and character would have been of great value to the Church at any time in any country. But it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which they could have been more urgently required than those in which he was called to exercise them.

He was born in 1826, and ordained in 1853. During the earlier part of his fifty years' ministry the struggle between religion and science was at its height. The champions of natural science were in many cases blatant and aggressive, while, on the other side, there was a good deal of timidity and blundering which has cost the Church dear. The danger of making devotion a refuge from disturbing truths (which always dogs religion) was really acute, and it was due to James Moorhouse at least as much as to any single man that the Church did not suffer almost irreparable disaster.

His intellectual powers were, beyond question, equal to those of his opponents; his scientific knowledge was real; his sincerity and piety could not be impugned. Men might disagree with him, but he could not be despised or ignored.

From 1876 to 1886 he was Bishop of Melbourne, and it is probably in Australia that his most enduring monument is to be found: first, in his successful labours on behalf of religious education, and secondly, in the stones of Melbourne Cathedral, of which he may be called "the onlie begetter." And the boldness with which he could rebuke vice is attested by the fact that at one time he engaged the particular attention of the notorious Kellys. Their plot was frustrated by the vigilance of the police.

From 1886 to 1903 he was Bishop of Manchester, a diocese which, if area as well as population be taken into account, ought probably to be considered the most laborious in Christendom. Nor was his task made easier by the fact that he had to follow Bishop Fraser. But his early experience in Sheffield stood him in good stead, and Lancashire soon recognized that here was a man whose head was far enough out of the smoke to see how the battle was really going; a man, moreover, who could be trusted never to pronounce an ill-considered judgment, and never to be turned from what he thought right, either by flattery or abuse. In 1903 he resigned the see, as he found that failing bodily powers made it impossible to maintain the relentless standard which he had always set

himself. Two passages from his farewell address to the clergy of his diocese may be quoted for the light which they throw upon his character and motives:

"I hope I have never troubled you with vain speculations or half-formed opinions which might alarm or distress you. But whenever I had no doubt that any conclusion of mine was true and just, that I have declared to you without fear, as clearly as I knew how to utter it."

"And now, brethren, what shall I say more? . . . To me the shadows are already breaking, and I seem to see beneath the dust-cloud of our noisy secularities the gathering and concentration of those spiritual energies which shall bear us on to man's predestined goal. . . . The upward straining of humanity towards union with God seems the only thing of supreme and abiding interest."

After his retirement he lived for twelve years at a house which he had taken in Somersetshire. He died on April 9, 1915.

Miss Richards has acquitted herself creditably. She has avoided the prolixity which ensnares many biographers, and the value of the book is increased by two appendices: one containing extracts from the Bishop's correspondence with his lifelong friend, Canon Wilson of Worcester; the other some thoughts on the nature of God and the meaning of salvation.

There are one or two small slips—*e.g.*, Westminster Abbey is not a cathedral (p. 113); and his return from Australia did not take place in 1891 (p. 143). Also, the proofs might have been corrected more carefully. But these are minor blemishes in an eminently readable book.

R. H. Malden.

The Eucharist in India. By J. C. Winslow, D. R. Athavale, J. E. G. Festing, E. C. Ratcliff. With a Preface by the Bishop of Bombay. Longmans. Price 7s. 6d.

This is to be reckoned among the books which are important, not only from their own contents, but also for the witness they bear to the development of new insight and bigger vision, and therefore of wiser policies, in the expansion of the Church. Its theme announces throughout that the Indian Church has come to self-consciousness. Only one problem is dealt with, but it is a central one—the provision of an Indian Liturgy. The issue, though less exciting and remarkable than the proposed plan of "the United Church of South India," is not less important, and tells the same tale—that the Indian Church insists on being Indian. Laus Deo.

Everybody now understands the importance of liturgy, as moulding and guarding the deepest, holiest moments of the life of a Christian Communion. Everybody understands, too, that the East does not and cannot worship in the same way as the West. Everybody, indeed, is convinced that the Prayer-Book translated can never be imposed upon the Indian Church. And yet no step whatever has been taken officially to relieve it of what must prove both a hindrance to its growth and a reproach to our own powers of sympathy and help. Missionary Anglicanism has no other theory, or desire, or goal, than that of building the Catholic Church amongst other tribes and nations on a national, not on an English foundation. That is intelligible and wise. But we seem reluctant to turn desire into fulfilment, theory into fact. The only excuse for the use of the Anglican Liturgy among native congregations is our comparative youth and inexperience as a missionary body; we

cannot provide for the Indian mind until we know it, until a generation of Indian Christians has arisen which can express the native religious mind in Christian terms. That time has come. We are already late of response.

The authors of this book, three English missionaries of sound liturgical knowledge, and an Indian deacon who speaks for India, offer an experimental Eucharistic liturgy. In part it is more than experimental, for it is based on that of the Syrian Church of South India, "which is a Church of the land as no other is, Indian in all its ways." But liturgy, in turn, is a conservative Indian adaptation of the Greek liturgy of St. James. Thus, continuity with the historic worship of Christendom is absolutely assured. The authors have, indeed, introduced Western elements, notably the variable Collects and Prefaces; but the chief Western influence which they have allowed is that of abbreviation; the Syrian Christians take three hours over the recital of their Eucharist. The work has been admirably done; on paper the new liturgy is strong, full, and rich, and moves easily. It deserves prolonged experiment.

A valuable part of the book is the Bishop of Bombay's Preface. First, it gives the history up to date of the Indian Bishops' handling of the problem. To us of the home Church that seems to have been timid and unimaginative to the last degree. Then it faces the feeling which lies behind this timidity, and discusses the value of that uniformity so dear to the Western mind. But it really is no longer possible to contemplate an Anglican uniformity the world over, for of all the great liturgies ours is the least satisfactory and the most purely national. And, lastly, there are many wise remarks on the way in which liturgical forms should grow. Only by use, by long and continued use, can a liturgy be proved and finally fashioned. This one is well enough designed to deserve such treatment. The effect upon a mighty Church of the future may be incalculably great and good.

E. Milner White.

In *Cambridge Offices and Orisons* (Mowbray, 3s. 6d. net) the Deans of King's and Sidney Sussex Colleges have provided us with a book of devotion of more than ordinary value. In it the familiar structure of Day Office and Litany is adapted to the use of small groups or congregations in church or home; and the compilation is marked by a rare faultlessness of choice as well as by a large range and variety of interest. It is a book to use "wherever two or three are gathered together"—a book for rich and poor, for simple as for educated folk. All the more, therefore, we hope that it will appear very shortly in a cheaper edition; for it deserves to be within the compass of even the most modest purse.

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